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Executive summary 
 
There is a strong case to act on climate change, for action now, and it is appropriate to 
do this with a low discount rate 
1. UK all-party commitment to near zero CO2 within the average person’s lifetime.  
2. Stern Review “The costs of stabilising the climate are significant but manageable; 
delay would be dangerous and much more costly.” Implies discounting future damage 
and damage-mitigating investment at a very low discount rate.  
3. Stern and others estimated the appropriate real discount rate at 1.4%.  HMG’s Green 
Book’s same approach proposes low discounting for long-lived projects (2.14%), 
based on an era of more optimistic growth assumptions and higher real interest rates.  
 
There is a positive macro-economic context in which we are able to take action now 
4. Public sector focus on debt not assets has led to underinvestment in infrastructure. 
5. Zero carbon projects capital-intensive; require high rates of investment to 
decarbonise. 
6. Global demographic trends led to a savings glut with falling real interest rates.1  The 
UK gilt index-linked 20-year real rate of interest has fallen steadily from 4% in 1995 
to -2% (negative) in 2019. The cost of public sector finance/support for infrastructure 
is at an all-time low.  
7. Monetary policy is weak, fiscal stimulus for public and private investment now 
needed.  
8. Need for zero carbon investment and potential supply of funds are aligned. 
 
Nuclear is low carbon and, at the right cost, will form a part of the future generation 
mix, but it has some specific investment challenges 
9. Committee on Climate Change: to reduce emissions intensity from current levels of 
175 gCO2 /kWh to near zero by 2050, some combination of nuclear, PV and wind is 
now cost effective. 
10. Nuclear power: lengthy uncertain construction period, high capital cost, low running 
cost, 60 years delivery of zero-carbon electricity, cost almost proportional to WACC.2  
                                                 
1 e.g. Rachel and Summers (2019) at https://www.brookings.edu/bpea-articles/on-falling-neutral-real-
rates-fiscal-policy-and-the-risk-of-secular-stagnation/  
2 Weighted average cost of capital, which for Thames Tideway Tunnel was 2.5% real (linked to RPI). 
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11. No nuclear plant has ever been built privately without substantial regulatory 
guarantees. 
12. Private sector unwilling to finance lengthy uncertain projects at low interest without 
credible guarantees and risk mitigation.  
 
The RAB model can align with the characteristics of nuclear to support investment 
13. Low WACC requires low risk and assurance of return. 
14. The benefits of placing risk on the developer to motivate cost control are small 
compared to the extra costs of a higher WACC, arguing for the lowest WACC 
consistent with adequate incentives. 
15. The hybrid RAB3 model (like the Thames Tideway Tunnel) with excess cost sharing 
and a cost cap can reduce risk to deliver an adequately low WACC by accessing 
infrastructure funds that do not require extensive specialised project knowledge. 
16. Once the project has been de-risked, funding could be secured by a competitive book 
building exercise, which would set the required return on the money. 
17. Payment on RAB during construction increases confidence, reduces risk and WACC. 
18. Limiting the risk of cost over-runs and providing a fairly predictable long term return 
could make this investment attractive to the growing pool of institutional investors 
who seek such “infrastructure-like” returns, but are put off by construction risk. 
 
The balance of the costs and benefits of introducing a RAB model means that it is worth 
doing   
19. Spreading the risk over the largest number of agents reduces the total cost of risk. If 
spread over the 27 million households and the other customers who took the 
remaining two-thirds of electricity, each would bear negligible cost of risk. 
20. RAB interest paid by domestic customers averages about £4/yr4 during the 
construction phase. The levelised cost over the 60 year life could be as low as 
£53/MWh discounting at the WACC of 3.5% if built on time and budget. 
21. Even in a worst case scenario with an 8 year delay and 48% cost over-run the 
levelised cost to consumers if they bear all the public sector investment cost is 
£64/MWh discounting at the consumer discount rate of 2% real.
                                                 
3 Regulatory Asset Base – accumulated investment less depreciation 
4 Unless otherwise stated, all figures are in £2018. 
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Abstract 
Decarbonising electricity is a critical first step in mitigating climate damage but low/zero-carbon 
generation is very capital intensive. Its cost depends critically on the weighted average cost of capital 
(WACC). Three factors combine to make a low WACC both desirable and feasible in the UK. First, 
the Stern Report argues for a low social discount rate (1.4% real) for investments in climate 
mitigation. Second, global and UK real interest rates have been falling steadily - UK gilt index-linked 
20-year rates have fallen from +4% in 1995 to -2% (negative) in 2019. CCS and nuclear have long 
lifetimes over which to recover their capital cost, longer than commercial finance would accept 
without guarantees, in contrast to renewables where off-take contracts have proven sufficient. Nuclear 
power faces the additional investment challenge of lengthy uncertain construction. No nuclear plant 
has ever been built privately without substantial regulatory guarantees. The Regulated Asset Base 
(RAB) model can address these financing problems for long-lived low-carbon assets. The benefits of 
placing risk on developers to motivate cost control are small compared to the extra costs of a higher 
weighted average cost of capital (WACC). The hybrid RAB model (like that used for the Thames 
Tideway Tunnel)—with excess cost sharing and a cost cap—can reduce risk to deliver an adequately 
low WACC by accessing infrastructure funds that do not require extensive specialised project 
knowledge. If the risk of excess costs is spread over the 27 million households and other customers 
taking two-thirds of electricity, each would bear minimal risk and the cumulative cost would be 
significantly lower. We find that the levelised cost at the WACC (3.5% real) is £53/MWh (in £2018) 
if on time and budget, which should be compared with a counterfactual in which all the risk is placed 
on the company requiring a contract-for-difference with a strike price of £96/MWh for the life of the 
project (equal to the levelised cost). The levelised cost to consumers if on time and budget would be 
£50/MWh and in the worst case with a 48% cost over-run, £64/MWh. 
 
1. Introduction 
There has been a wide-ranging cross-party commitment to aggressively decarbonise the UK 
economy in line with the Climate Change Act (HoC, 2008) and COP 21. This was reinforced 
by legislation laid on 12 June 2019 for the UK to become the first major economy to set a net 
zero emissions target (Priestley, 2019). The easiest and the leading sector to decarbonise is 
electricity, since here the options lie on the supply side without requiring any change in the 
final product (electricity). According to the Committee on Climate Change (CCC), 75% of 
emissions reduction since 2012 have come from the power sector. Emissions intensity has 
                                                 
1 Paper commissioned by EDF Energy, and with grateful acknowledgement for their comments and 
support. The paper solely represents views and analysis by the authors.  It should not be taken to 
reflect EDF Energy positions.  This paper was written in anticipation of a government consultation on 
the Regulated Asset Base (RAB) model for nuclear, but before its publication by BEIS on 22 July 
2019: https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/regulated-asset-base-rab-model-for-nuclear.  We 
are indebted to the thorough responses of three referees which allowed us to clarify key points in the 
paper. 
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fallen from 420 gCO2e/kWh as recently as 2015 to 173 gm CO2e/kWh, by 2018 (BEIS, 2019)  
but the CCC argues that “A further reduction in the emissions intensity of power generation, 
to below 100 gCO2/kWh by 2030 remains the lowest-cost path towards economy-wide 
decarbonisation.” (CCC, 2018, p. 68). The CCC’s 2030 electricity target is 77% “low carbon” 
compared to 52% in 2017. The 2017 capacity of existing nuclear was 9.2 GW but is forecast 
to fall to 1.2 GW by 2030, to which should be added Hinkley Point C of 3.6 GW. 
Zero-carbon generation (wind, solar PV, tidal, nuclear) are notable in having high 
capital costs and low variable costs. Renewables are variable, nuclear power is best run on 
base load because of its cost characteristics, although in France it plays a limited load-
following role (Nuttall, 2005, p. 63). Low-carbon generation (coal or gas with carbon capture 
and storage, CCS) and negative-carbon (bio-energy with CCS, or BECCS) also have high 
capital costs but high variable costs and are flexible. Each technology therefore has specific 
characteristics, both strengths and limitations, which will influence its potential role in 
decarbonising electricity. 
High capital cost plant faces significant barriers in liberalised markets requiring 
commercial rates of return. Since the privatization of electricity in the UK, liberalization has 
favoured gas (mostly combined cycle, but recently some open-cycle turbines) with 
renewables requiring additional support, most effectively with the recent contracts-for 
differences (CfDs) with a Feed-in-Tariff (FiT), A standard CfD guarantees the strike price, s, 
for a specified volume of output, M MW and time, settled against a reference (usually day-
ahead) wholesale price, p. The generator receives pM from the wholesale market and (s-p).M, 
from the CfD, ensuring sM provided the generator delivers. The FiT element allows for the 
variability of the renewables. The Energy Act 2013 (HoC, 2013) recognised the importance 
of extending some investment assurance to conventional generation through auctioned 
capacity agreements, but again this only attracted gas (and small diesel) generation. 
This paper argues that a low discount rate is critical for efficient decarbonisation, that 
such a discount rate is justified (§2), that the private sector can now deliver that with suitable 
assurances (§3), but that nuclear power faces additional hurdles, possibly comparable to those 
of fossil generation. Section 5 proposes a possible model for funding such investments, 
arguing that the two key conditions—regulatory assurance for long-lived low-return assets 
and efficient risk allocation—can be met with a hybrid Regulated Asset Base (RAB) model. 
Section 6 shows how this could be implemented in the case of the proposed Sizewell C 
nuclear reactor, followed by a discussion of whether this could command public support (§7), 
and the conclusions. 
 
2. The case for a low discount rate 
The Stern Report (Stern, 2007, p viii) states that “Climate change is the greatest market 
failure the world has ever seen, and it interacts with other market imperfections.” “The costs 
of stabilising the climate are significant but manageable; delay would be dangerous and much 
more costly.” The Stern Report lays out the arguments for a low social discount rate. It 
logically follows that the social discount rate is used not only to measure the damage caused 
by releasing CO2 now, but should also be the rate used to discount the future benefits of zero-
carbon generation investments that avoid damaging CO2 emissions. (There are additional 
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arguments relating to risk and distributional concerns that strengthen the case for a low rate 
that are discussed below.)  
The UK Government and the 2015 Conference of Parties in the Paris Agreement 
(COP 21) accept that climate change justifies actions to mitigate its effect. The reason that the 
cost of future damage loom so large today is because Stern and others have convinced us of 
the importance of low discount rates for future uncertain but potentially catastrophic events. 
£1 million of damage in 100 years at a discount rate of 6% is worth just under £3,000, but at 
Stern’s discount rate of 1.4% worth almost £250,000, 84 times as much. It follows that long-
lived zero-carbon investments should also be appraised and discounted at a low discount rate. 
The UK Government’s Appraisal Manual (The Green Book, HMT, 2018) follows the 
same utilitarian public economics theory that guided the estimates of the discount rate in the 
Stern Report. It sets out the principles of social cost-benefit analysis for appraising projects 
whose private returns are likely to understate their social benefits. That is pre-eminently the 
case with investments in zero-carbon technologies to mitigate climate change.  
Stern (2007, p46) derives the social discount rate, denoted ρ, and the same logical 
approach is followed in the Green Book (HMT, 2018, Appendix A). Stern’s formula is  
ρ = δ +ηg,      (1) 
where δ is the rate of pure time preference, g is the long-term growth rate of per capita 
consumption, and η is the elasticity of marginal utility, a measure of the rate at which the 
utility of an extra increment of consumption falls.2 In a strictly utility-based approached to 
risk aversion, η is also the coefficient of relative risk aversion, and as such is relevant when 
discussing the cost of risk.  
For sound ethical reasons Stern takes η = 1, equivalent to a logarithmic utility 
function, which would, to quote Stern (2007, p46) “value an increment in consumption 
occurring when utility was 2c as half as valuable as if it occurred when consumption was c.” 
It has the appealing ethical force that lives saved are considered equally worthy regardless of 
the wealth or poverty of the individual.3 Stern argues for a low value of pure time preference, 
δ = 0.1%, on the grounds that it corresponds to a 9.5% probability of the human race not 
surviving 100 years, while a δ = 1% corresponds to a worryingly high 62% probability of the 
human race not surviving 100 years (Stern, 2001, p47).  
                                                 
2 We use social to contrast with other discount rates such as those used by the private sector. Stern 
calls ρ the discount rate without qualification, but in the context it is the discount rate to apply to the 
future damage of climate change. The Green Book uses slightly different notation, terming the social 
discount rate as the Social Time Preference Rate (STPR), r, with the rate of pure time preference 
confusingly as ρ, with r = ρ+μg, where g is the “expected growth rate of future real per capita 
consumption”.  Goulder and Williams (2012) derive this same, widely accepted formula, which they 
describe as “the discount rate appropriate for determining whether a given policy would augment 
social welfare (according to a postulated social welfare function) ..” (p. 6). 
3 Social cost-benefit manuals appraise transport improvements in terms of the Value of a Statistical 
Life (VOSL) Saved, while health benefits are valued in terms of Quality Adjusted Life-years 
(QALYs) saved. Both are usually taken proportional to per capita consumption, suggesting the VOSL 
in a poor country is much less than in a rich country. When weighted using the logarithmic utility 
function (η = 1) both lives would be equally socially valued. 
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The final assumption needed to fix the social discount rate is a plausible rate of 
growth of per capita consumption over long periods of time. The Green Book retains its past 
rather optimistic g of 2% while admitting that over the past 20 years the UK has fallen 
considerably below this. Looking ahead, g is constrained by global sustainability (water, 
population pressure, etc. etc.). There is consensus around Stern’s value of 1.3% p.a. (accepted 
by Cline, 1992 and Nordhaus, 2007). Together this gives a social discount rate of 1.4% in (1). 
The rate used for long-term discounting by the UK Government was reduced after the Stern 
Report from 2.5% after 75 years to 2.14%, and from 1% over 300 years to 0.86%, after 
setting δ = 0 (HMT, 2018, p104 and HMT, 2008, p5). For a project lasting 31-75 years and 
taking δ = 0.1, the discount rate would be 2.67%, falling to 2.24% after 75 years.  For 
projects affecting future health, the rate is taken as 0.86% on the argument that “diminishing 
marginal utility associated with higher incomes does not apply as the welfare or utility 
associated with additional years of life will not decline as real incomes rise.” (HMT, 2018, 
A6.21). 
Greater future uncertainty argues for lower social discounting, as a symmetric 
outcome of either high (BAU growth) or low (catastrophe) future consumption translates into 
a greater weight on the low rather than the high outcome. This further lowers the appropriate 
social discount rate. Low discount rates make solving the problem of carbon emissions 
cheaper and more attractive. The Stern Report and the Government’s own Green Book argue 
for a low discount rate when appraising projects with a long time horizon and appreciable 
future social benefits that may be heavily discounted by the private sector.  
 
3. The macro-economic background of falling real interest rates 
Public sector focus on debt while ignoring assets has led to underinvestment in infrastructure. 
It has also led to doubtful fiscal accounting to transfer what would otherwise appear as public 
debt onto private balance sheets via initiatives such as the private finance initiative (PFI) and 
Public–Private Partnerships PPP (popular for hospitals and schools).4 These often result in 
creating essentially the same assets but at a higher cost to the public exchequer and an overall 
worse economy-wide balance sheet.  
The need for proper fiscal accounting has been stressed in a recent IMF publication. 
“Standard fiscal analysis focuses on flows—revenues, expenditures, and deficits—with 
assessments of stocks largely limited to gross debt. The focus on debt misses large swaths of 
government activity and can fall victim to illusory fiscal practices. (IMF, 2018, p. 9). 
What is particularly notable is that the UK’s net worth started negative and has 
become more negative, while “other assets” (mainly physical assets in infrastructure) have 
not increased. Instead of inflating financial public corporations’ assets (aka bank lending) to 
stimulate the economy during the global financial crisis of 2008, stimulating infrastructure 
investment (as was started in the US under the Obama administration) would have resulted in 
a healthier net wealth position while creating assets that would continue to yield economic 
                                                 
4 For a comparison of PPP and RAB finance see Makovšek and Veryard (2016) and references 
therein. 
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benefits.5 As the IMF noted “Net worth declined by a similar, although slightly lower, 25 
percentage points of GDP, with the difference attributable to public investment.6  This 
average marks a wide dispersion, with net worth declining by as much as 49 percentage 
points of GDP in the United Kingdom, while increasing by 167 percentage points of GDP in 
Norway, much of this because of strong valuation gains from its equity holdings.” IMF 
(2018, p. 8). 
On the positive side “The United Kingdom authorities are at an early stage in the 
process of balance sheet management. They recently initiated a balance sheet review, 
intended to improve balance sheet management and fiscal outcomes …” (IMF, 2018, p19). 
Not only has the UK balance sheet deteriorated as a result of relying on monetary 
stimulus rather than raising the rate of investment, but the cost of financing infrastructure 
investment is at an all-time low, as Rachel and Summers (2019, fig 1) demonstrates. The 
world real interest rates on inflation-linked bonds fell almost linearly from over 6% at its 
peak in 1982 to below zero by 2014, where it remained until at least 2018.  
 
Figure 1 Real spot interest rates for UK index-linked gilts and US TIPS 
Source: Bank of England https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/statistics/yield-curves and 
https://fred.stlouisfed.org  
                                                 
5 The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009 allocated $105.3 billion to 
infrastructure, although the whole package, which included tax cuts, was estimated at $787 billion. 
According to the Council of Economic Advisors’ report “The two established CEA methods of 
estimating the impact of the fiscal stimulus suggest that the ARRA has raised the level of GDP as of 
the third quarter of 2010, relative to what it otherwise would have been, by 2.7 percent. These 
estimates are very similar to those of a wide range of other analysts, including the non-partisan 
Congressional Budget Office.”  (CEA, 2010, p. i) 
6  The net worth of 17 countries fell from 43% in 2007 to 18% in 2012, its value in 2016. (Explanation 
added by authors.) 
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Figure 1 shows that UK real indexed-gilt rates (both 10 and 20-year maturity) have 
declined roughly linearly from +4% in early 1994 to its current negative -2.5% real.  Even the 
40-year maturity rate (for which data are only available from 2016) is only slightly higher 
than the 10-year maturity. The US real rate has remained (mostly) positive in the recent past 
but still well below its historic levels. 
In their important article, Rachel and Summers (2019, p1) demonstrate “that neutral 
real interest rates7 would have declined by far more than what has been observed in the 
industrial world and would in all likelihood be significantly negative but for offsetting fiscal 
policies over the last generation. …We show … that neutral real interest rates have declined 
by at least 300 basis points over the last generation. We argue that these secular movements 
are in larger part a reflection of changes in saving and investment propensities rather than the 
safety and liquidity properties of Treasury instruments. We then point out that the movements 
in the neutral real rate reflect both developments in the private sector and in public policy. 
…we suggest that the “private sector neutral real rate” may have declined by as much as 700 
basis points since the 1970s. Our findings support the idea that, absent offsetting policies, 
mature industrial economies are prone to secular stagnation. … More broadly, a large share 
of the decline in risk-free rates has been mirrored in risky asset returns, such as rates of return 
on corporate bonds and on equites: notwithstanding some volatility, spreads have remained 
close to long-run historical averages.” (Rachel and Summers, 2019, p2; fig 3, p5.)  
They show that the US equity risk premium has fallen from around 5% only to around 
4½% in 2016, but combined with the fall in the risk-free rate the cost of equity has now also 
fallen quite dramatically. The reason they give for the fall in the real interest rate is primarily 
the excess supply of private savings relative to private investment: “on average across the 
business cycle, equilibration of private-sector saving and private-sector investment may 
indeed require very low real rate of interest in advanced economies for years to come.” (ibid, 
p7). These arguments “thus underscore the urgent priority for governments to find new 
sustainable ways of promoting investment to absorb the large supply of private savings and to 
devise novel long-term strategies to rekindle private demand.” (ibid: Conclusions, p. 43).  
While there may be debates about the possible causes of the falling interest rate, it is 
hard to disagree with evidence that it has fallen quite steadily and by a remarkable amount 
since the early days of electricity liberalization. In addition, monetary policy is now very 
weak given the low nominal interest rates and high net debt, making fiscal policy and policy-
stimulated investment the only way to address future economic downturns, and, in the 
Rachel/Summers view, avoid pending secular stagnation. This policy point needs 
underlining. The private sector is reluctant to invest commercially in long-lived assets when 
the rate of return falls to the currently observed low levels. The reason has been amply 
explained by Avner Offer (2018). The private sector requires considerable reassurance to 
undertake investments with a time horizon much longer than 10-15 years, given the rapidly 
growing uncertainty and vulnerability to at-present unforeseen policy shocks beyond this 
horizon. Offer terms this the credit time horizon, defined as the time to pay back the loan. 
                                                 
7 The interest rate consistent with stable macroeconomic performance. 
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With a horizon less than 15 years the required rate of return is 10% or more, hence the 
growing mismatch between private savings and infrastructure-like investment. If investment 
is to be stimulated at much lower weighted average costs of capital (WACCs) then policy 
support to provide investor confidence will be needed. The alternative is that the funds are 
merely deflected into creating asset inflation in land and real estate that might appear to enjoy 
greater (tacit) public and therefore political support against expropriation or wealth-reducing 
tax or rule changes. 
Fortunately, the demand for infrastructure investment (notably transport, but also 
public housing) combined with a more intelligent approach to public sector accounting 
looking at both sides of the balance sheet can help avoid this stagnation. Even more relevant 
in the current context, mitigating damaging climate change requires huge levels of investment 
as zero-carbon projects are very capital-intensive. To conclude this section, the need for zero 
carbon investment and potential supply of funds are aligned, and the key role of the public 
sector is to find policies to stimulate private investment. 
 
4. Investment challenges facing nuclear power 
The main supply-side options available to decarbonise electricity are nuclear power, 
renewables (wind, solar PV and biomass), and carbon capture and storage (CCS). Wind and 
solar PV are variable and hence need back-up from flexible fossil power, at least for the near 
future. Other flexibility options have high capital costs, and would require a high carbon price 
to compete with flexible gas, but France has demonstrated that nuclear can load follow (Cany 
et al, 2016). Advanced nuclear options such as small modular reactors have also been 
receiving attention for their lower upfront capital costs and their greater flexibility although 
the economics are still untested (Richards et al, 2017).  
CCS systems, particularly based on natural gas plants, could be operated flexibly and 
would have numerous degrees of flexibility depending on the ability to ramp up and down 
both the gas turbine and the capture unit, the use of solvent regeneration and the position in 
the merit order (Mechleri et al, 2017; Schnellmann et al, 2018).  Real-world performance of 
CCS flexibly is unproven both in cost and performance terms. Biomass with CCS may also 
deliver flexible generation where emissions could even be net negative, depending on the 
sustainability of the biomass (Bui et al, 2017).  
Only storage hydro (a small part of which we could access with an interconnector to 
Norway) can address shortfalls of more than a day, while pumped storage can handle diurnal 
fluctuations and batteries only for an hour or so. Their combined contribution over hours is 
less than 10% of peak winter demand. Nuclear power is a mature technology, whereas CCS 
has yet to be deployed at scale in the European power sector (although several plants have 
begun operating in North America).  Nuclear and CCS face public acceptance issues, 
although the UK appears more accepting than many other countries. Nuclear waste disposal, 
decommissioning and CO2 storage raise long-term safety and management issues (Kröger & 
Fischer, 2000; Budnitz et al, 2018). 
Variable renewables are modular, come in modest sized units of a few MW, are quick 
to build (PV is fastest, off-shore wind slowest), have benefited from manufacturing scale 
economies, but have limited lifetimes (20-25 years). CCS units are large (300+ MW) and 
might be as durable as coal-fired stations (30-60 years).  
Thus, nuclear power is at the extreme of cost, size and relevant lifetime. Hinkley 
Point C (HPC) entered its present planning phase with the submission by EDF/AREVA NP 
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of the European Pressurised Water Reactor (EPR) design to the Office for Nuclear 
Regulation in September 2007 (NAO 2017b). Final Investment Decision was taken in 2016, 
and commissioning is not expected until 2025. Its lifetime may then be 60 years (or more) but 
decommissioning and waste management will continue for many decades thereafter. 
All low/zero-carbon options have high capital cost and low variable costs (except 
CCS), which implies that their cost of energy is highly sensitive to the Weighted Average 
Cost of Capital (WACC). Nuclear power is an extreme case of this, as halving the WACC 
roughly halves the required strike price for any contract (see e.g. NAO, 2017b, fig 20, p68 
and Appendix B). If, optimistically, private finance were only twice as costly as public 
finance, its private pay-back period (simply computed) would be half that of the government. 
Government guarantees or their regulatory equivalent (such as the US model of rate-of-return 
regulation underpinned by a Constitutionally-backed rule of law) can provide reassurances, 
lower the cost of capital and extend this credit horizon. 
In any infrastructure project the risks can be divided into construction risk and 
operating & commercial risk (post-construction). Investors need ex ante compensation for 
these risks, and the higher the risk the higher the expected return.  
Nuclear is unusual, if not quite unique, in having a very high proportion of 
construction risk relative to operating and commercial risk (although political risk of 
premature closure remains potentially important). Once built, nuclear reactors have a 
generally good record of operations and face relatively low operating risk: fuel is a very small 
fraction of cost compared with, say, gas powered stations, and nuclear has been very 
competitive in bidding into markets so it faces little risk of not running. Nuclear faces price 
risk that may be higher than for price-setting plant such as CCGT, where prices of gas and of 
electricity follow each other closely, providing a natural hedge (Roques et al., 2006). As with 
other renewable generators in a liberalised market, a suitable hedge normally requires an off-
take contract. Nobody would build a merchant nuclear plant and take on that risk. 
Nuclear’s recent and long term construction history makes it difficult to mobilise 
private capital. Although it might seem there is a price for every kind of risk, the ex ante 
returns needed to compensate for construction risk are for the most part too high to be 
credible so there is, in effect, a threshold beyond which no level of expected return can 
practically motivate private investors—the point that Offer (2018) stresses. In this case the 
risk must be reduced to an acceptable level. 
The range of risk-bearing options is illustrated in Table 1, which shows the risk 
arrangements for a range of recent new nuclear build projects.  
Note that the ultimate ownership of the nuclear station does not immediately tell us 
about risk bearing: the UAE project will belong to the government but the construction 
contract leaves most of the risk with the South Korean consortium building the four reactors, 
who are compensated ex post by a long-term operating contract.  
It is no coincidence that EDF, KEPCO, Areva and CGN are all state-owned 
companies (with some private share ownership in some cases). No fully private company 
would normally take on the construction risk and no contractor would be willing to sign a 
contract with a private company without actual or de facto state backing because the 
counterparty risk is so high and the single project size tends to be large relative to the 
enterprise value of the firm undertaking it. 
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Table 1 Risk management in recent new nuclear projects  
Reactor Country Status Construction risk Power price risk Debt guarantee? 
Olkilotuo 3 Finland Under 
construction 
Contractor (Areva) Customers No 
Flamanville 3 France Under 
construction 
Sponsor (EdF) Customers (via 
regulation) 
No 
Vogtle USA Under 
construction 
Customers (via 
regulator) 
Customers (via 
regulator) 
Federal 
government 
Barakah UAE Under 
construction 
Sponsor (KEPCO-
led consortium) 
Customers (fixed 
price contract) 
South Korean 
government 
Hinkley Point 
C 
UK Under 
construction 
Sponsors (EDF and 
CGN) 
Customers (fixed 
price contract) 
UK government 
Source: World Nuclear Association; author’s estimates 
This was illustrated by the Chapter 11 bankruptcy of the Toshiba subsidiary 
Westinghouse, which took on fixed price construction obligations for US projects which it 
ultimately could not meet. This demonstrates the limit of allocating all risk to those ‘best 
placed to manage it’. Despite the very strong incentives on Westinghouse to avoid cost 
overruns (so strong it was a question of solvency, as the evidence showed) the overruns 
occurred. As a result the half-complete projects in South Carolina have been abandoned (a 
deadweight economic loss) and Voglte continues – though the transition imposed costs. A 
more sensible risk allocation (with more risk sharing) could have achieved full incentives on 
Westinghouse to minimise costs while not exposing them to insolvency, and therefore 
allowed the South Carolina projects to complete.   
Before the oil shock and inflationary burst of the 1970’s, the US regulatory model 
seemed able to provide the necessary credible underwriting from utilities empowered to pass 
the cost through to final consumers.  However, the latter model ran into difficulties when 
inflation raised electricity costs, requiring a rate review. A rate review requires utility 
commissions to scrutinise costs and investment plans to ensure they are “just and 
reasonable”. The Washington Public Power Supply System had started on one nuclear plant 
and had plans for four more, with two units starting in 1977. WPPSS had the right to issue 
tax-favoured municipal bonds to finance investments without voter approval, but a voter 
initiative in 1981 denied WPPSS the right to issue more bonds. Construction was suspended 
and eventually only the first reactor was ever completed (Blumstein, 1983).  Joskow (1989) 
records that perhaps 20% of the final cost of nuclear power plant investments (i.e. tens of 
billions of dollars) in the US were disallowed by regulators and hence absorbed by private 
shareholders, in the era of private monopoly generation. 
This case has many lessons – that nuclear power plants that suffer cost and time over-
runs face the risk that utility commissioners will disallow them as “not used or useful” or 
“imprudent” (Gilbert and Newbery, 1994). Nuclear power in particular raises public concerns 
that require government assurance if the regulatory compact is to be credible. This is even 
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more the case in periods of low real interest rates where investors have to wait an improbably 
long time to recover their investment, if they lack credible guarantees and risk mitigation. 
Recent US experience shown in Table 1 reinforces this point. Two new nuclear 
reactors under construction have been halted in South Carolina following huge cost over-
runs. Some other older plants are likely to close early owing to the pressure on power prices. 
But two reactors at the Vogtle project are under construction in Georgia, sponsored by 
Southern Company and approved by the Georgia Public Service Commission (the state 
regulator for telecoms, gas and electricity). 
Georgia remains a rate-base regulated state, meaning that the electricity selling price 
is determined by the GPSC. This covers both operating costs and investment costs. Broadly 
speaking, the regulator ensures that the utility receives a fair cost of capital on investment. 
For a new investment project such as Vogtle, which like other projects building the 
Westinghouse AP1000 reactor has proved highly troublesome, this implies some risk-bearing 
by the customer (the “rate base”). When costs rise above original estimates, the utility makes 
a case to the regulator for those costs to be added to the rate base. The regulator may not 
approve all of them but, if it wants to get the plant built it is under some pressure to concede 
most costs. 
 
5. The RAB model for long-lived capital-intensive investment 
We have argued that long-term investment in zero-carbon technologies like nuclear power is 
necessary, and that it is justified at, but requires, low financing costs (or WACCs). There is a 
case for developing new financing models on a technology-neutral approach for all such 
cases where a simple CfD (with or without a FiT) would not provide adequate investor 
assurance to sufficiently lower the WACC.  For example, the RAB model has been proposed 
for use with the transport and storage infrastructure needed for CCS plants or for shifting 
towards hydrogen for heat (CCTF, 2018; SCCS, 2018). Rather than describe the special 
features of all such technologies, for most of the rest of the paper we concentrate on the next 
proposed new nuclear power station at Sizewell C, as that is the subject of an impending 
public inquiry (Ambrose, 2019). 
A low WACC requires low risk and a credible assurance of returns to the investors. 
No western8 EPR has yet been commissioned, while cost and construction over-runs have 
plagued the two previous EPR projects in Finland and France.  Given Continental (and hence 
EU) concerns over nuclear power, the “Coalition Government agreement stated there would 
be no subsidy for nuclear power. This led the Department to negotiate a deal for HPC 
replicating as far as possible its contracts to support other low-carbon technologies, such as 
wind and solar. These contracts mean the private sector financing construction and taking all 
the risk during this phase of the project, in return for a guaranteed price for the electricity 
generated once completed.” (NAO, 2017b, p8), 
The Government’s Green Book appraisal manual states that: “The responsibility for 
management of risk should be allocated to the organisation best placed to manage it whether 
                                                 
8 Taishan, China’s EPR, was commissioned in December 2018 (https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
china-france-nuclear/china-launches-worlds-first-epr-nuclear-project-in-taishan-idUSKBN1OD0Y4 ) 
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in the public or private sector. The objective is optimal allocation of risk, not maximum 
transfer, and this is important to deliver Value for Money. Not all risks can be transferred.” 
(HMT 2018, A5.32, emphasis added.)  
The workhorse of utility regulation and portfolio valuation is the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model (CAPM). At its heart, this is based on expected utility theory, in which an equal 
probability of an increase or decrease in wealth of X is worth less than the certainty of 
enjoying X (see Appendix E for a mathematical treatment). The cost of that risk can be 
measured by the risk premium r required to make the risky prospect X+r have the same value 
or utility as the expected or certain value EX. 
Figure 2 illustrates this. The utility of (or value placed on) consumption, U(C), is 
plotted against different values of consumption. The risky choice is an equal chance of 
receiving 4 or 8 units of consumption at points A or B, a deviation of 2 from the mean, with 
expected value 6. The utility value of a certain level of consumption 6 shown as 42 but the 
average or expected utility is ½U(4)+ ½U(8) = 40 = U(5.528). The cost of risk in this case is  
6 - 5.528 = 0.472, shown as the distance MN. If the risk is shared between two agents with 
equally likely outcomes C or D, then the deviation from the mean is halved, and each now 
has an expected utility of ½U(5)+ ½U(7) = 41.5 = U(5.877) and the cost of risk is now 0.123. 
However, there are two agents bearing this cost, so the total cost is twice this, or 0.246, which 
is half the cost of risk if just one agent bears all the risk.9 More generally, in this quadratic 
approximation to the local shape of the utility function,10 the total cost of risk divided equally 
                                                 
9 In utility terms the cost of risk is exactly halved, but as Appendix E shows, measured in 
consumption units the cost is only approximately halved, in this case to 52%. The other main message 
from CAPM is the cost of a risky project depends not on the absolute risk of the project but on its 
correlation with the existing portfolio. This is captured by the value of β, a key component of 
determining the WACC in utility regulation. See Appendix E. 
10 This is equivalent to taking a second order expansion around the mean as in Appendix E, and 
ignoring higher order terms, which will only be valid for limited risks. Fat tails or extreme events 
would seriously invalidate this approximation. 
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among n equally placed agents is 1/n the cost of one similar agent bearing all the risk. 
 
Figure 2 Illustration of cost of risk and risk premium 
Note: The utility function is U(C ) = 10C - ½C2 
The implication is that placing all the risk of construction on the developer is 
potentially very large compared to spreading that risk over, for example, all 27 million 
households who enjoy electricity, and the remaining 70% of industrial, commercial and other 
consumers who consume higher amounts. This is not a fair comparison, however, as in the 
case of building nuclear power plants, the construction and operating risks are likely to have a 
low correlation with GNP, Government income and public sector net assets, and with the 
stock market. In short, they are largely idiosyncratic risks. That might suggest that they can 
be widely diversified through the stock market, but we again run into the problems of the 
time horizon and the perceived risk of political intervention (as in Germany). The problem is 
that the risks are not considered to be distributed around a known mean value. Especially 
with construction risk, shareholders take the view that any financial proposal (particularly 
one coming from a company committed to such projects) is likely to have huge optimism 
bias.  
If all the risk is transferred to consumers, the concern would be that the developer 
would have little incentive to manage the risk, and might instead be more concerned to avoid 
adverse outcomes by excessively gold-plating the project. This tendency was widely 
observed in the US cost-of-service regulation, most notably in the monopoly Bell Telephone 
Company, where costs could be passed through to final consumers. The result was high 
prices and low choice of equipment This Averch-Johnson effect (Averch and Johnson, 1962) 
has been widely documented and lies at the heart of the Principal-Agent problem – how does 
the principal (the share-holder, the consumer, or the Government) design a contract that 
provides sufficient incentive to the agent (the developer, construction company, workers) to 
manage risks, reduce costs and deliver on time and budget, without imposing so much risk 
that the costs outweigh the benefit. Appendix B shows how this might be done, and 
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demonstrates that the benefits of placing risk on the developer to motivate cost control are 
small compared to the extra costs of a higher WACC. That implies designing a contract that 
delivers the lowest WACC consistent with providing adequate incentives for efficient 
management.  
4.1 RAB and hybrid RAB models 
The Regulated Asset Base (RAB) approach to utility regulation has been used successfully in 
the UK since the late 1980s (see Appendix C for more details). The RAB is the amount of 
capital that the regulator recognises as deserving a return. When combined with a statutory 
obligation to ensure the utility can fund itself, the RAB becomes a very low risk asset. This 
means a low cost of capital which in turn means lower prices for customers.  
The RAB model was designed for natural monopoly utilities where there is no 
possibility of competition.  Where competition is possible the rate of return should emerge 
from competitive entry and exit, with the regulator ensuring competition works. 
With a fixed allowed rate of return on the RAB, the system would closely resemble 
the traditional rate of return regulation used for many decades in the USA. That system was 
criticised for i) lacking incentives to cut costs (since the increase in profit would be clawed 
back entirely by the regulator, a form of 100% profit tax); and ii) encouraging over-
investment in assets (the Averch-Johnson effect). Both adverse effects can be mitigated. In 
the US as noted above costs can be disallowed if they are “not used or useful” or “imprudent” 
while in the UK there are incentives to provide accurate assessments of future investment 
costs and to deliver them efficiently. 
The UK system of periodic price reviews encouraged cost saving (in both operating 
and capital spending) by providing fixed prices for a period followed by a review. So long as 
there is no retrospective clawback of earlier cost savings, the investor is incentivised to cut 
costs and economise on capital spending. The RAB approach in the original privatization 
Acts offered a rolling 25-year contract that could be revisited periodically (typically every 5 
years).11 At that point the regulator had to check that the original terms were fair and not 
exploitative to current and future consumers, and ensured financeability. If not, prices could 
be re-set for a further period until the next price review. Over time, the UK RAB model of 
regulation has created investor confidence and a falling real WACC, proving to be a valuable 
commitment device (Stern, 2013). 
4.2 Hybrid RAB – the Thames Tideway Tunnel 
The RAB has been used for a company (though one that can have multiple shareholders). An 
extension of the concept is to use it for a discrete project, also possibly with multiple 
shareholders. This might be done because the project is too large relative to the existing 
company assets for the shareholders to be comfortable holding the risk, or because it has 
some special characteristics that justify it being treated separately from the rest of the 
company’s assets. 
                                                 
11 This was increased to 8 years with the move from RPI-X to RIIO but Ofgem now considers that 
was probably too long, see Ofgem (2018). 
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The Thames Tideway Tunnel (TTT) is an example of what we might call a hybrid 
RAB. In 2015, the government put in place the Government Support Package, which 
transfers some potential project risks from customers and investors to taxpayers. The features 
have both common elements with conventional RAB models and distinctive elements: 
i) the project is a discrete, ring-fenced capital investment, though with operating 
interconnections with Thames Water’s existing assets;  
ii) the project has external investors that are different from those of Thames Water 
itself;  
iii) the project has explicit construction risk-sharing with customers (through the 
regulator); and  
iv) the project receives financial returns before construction is complete. 
Point iii) is most relevant for new nuclear since that is the most salient point for 
private investors. As discussed above, the more the construction risk is borne by customers, 
the lower the returns required by the investors, which means lower prices paid by customers.  
Point iv) is another way of reducing the required return to investors, since it reduces 
the period of discounting. All else being equal, the sooner cash is paid, the lower the internal 
rate of return of the project and the lower the expected return of investors. Investors are ready 
to accept very long payback periods, e.g. in the oil industry, subject to a compensating higher 
expected return. Many pension funds invest in private equity funds that are typically tied up 
for 10 years without any return until the fund is liquidated. They obviously expect a higher 
return for such investments (including a premium for the illiquidity of the investment, 
compared with owning publicly quoted shares). The actual deal struck with TTT was for a 
WACC or regulated return of 2.497% (NAO, 2017a, §3.8.)12 Initial estimates of the cost of 
the project to consumers of £70-80 per annum were cut to £20-25 (in 2016-17 prices) with 
this financing model. 
If the goal is to reduce prices paid by customers, then earlier servicing of the return to 
capital will achieve this. In the case of the TTT, risk was reduced by cost-sharing of any cost 
over-runs (symmetrically, in that cost under-runs would also be shared). Appendix D 
examines a possible contract to illustrate the potential risk-reductions, but the final details are 
best left to negotiations with potential financiers. Once these details are clarified, funding 
could be secured by a competitive book building exercise, which would set the required 
return on the money (the WACC). Limiting the risk of cost over-runs and providing a fairly 
predictable long-term return could make this investment attractive to the growing pool of 
institutional investors who seek such “infrastructure-like” returns, but are put off by 
construction risk and the need for specialised industry knowledge in the absence of a 
regulatory oversight and guarantee of prudent management. 
                                                 
12 Although the report does not say exactly what this means, regulated returns for utilities are 
normally real not nominal — Ofwat (2014, 5.2) “In the absence of a fundamental change in policy or 
methodology by which the industry is economically regulated, our approach to remunerating both 
debt and equity investors is expected to be to set a real WACC which ensures that an efficient IP is 
able to finance the proper carrying out of its functions.” TTT’s WACC is close to the Government’s 
35-71 year social discount rate of 2.57%. It is indexed to the RPI that is equivalent to 3% CPI-linked. 
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4.3 Comparing the US and UK approaches 
The US approach puts most of the risk onto customers, who are not directly able to influence 
them, but whose agent is the commissioner (regulator). There is the danger that the investor is 
insufficiently motivated to manage construction costs but there remains the risk that the 
regulator will not simply wave through all cost increases, which should discipline the investor 
to manage costs. The customers bear much of the risk but benefit from the cost of capital 
being kept low and therefore a lower overall price of electricity compared with more investor 
risk-bearing which implies a higher cost of capital. 
The UK approach for conventional generation investment requires a higher cost of 
capital to incentivise the investors. So although customers avoid bearing any construction 
risk, they “pay” for this in the form of costlier power, with a partial cap set by the gain-share 
mechanism (partial because there is no absolute cap on the investor return). This was less of a 
problem with cheap gas-fired generation but would be with more costly plant.  
Broadly speaking, there is a trade-off between customer risk-bearing (or risk-bearing 
by the state) and the investor’s expected return, which directly affects the contract price. If 
the contract price is the most visible and important aspect for public policy, the case for at 
least some risk bearing by customers or the state is strong.  
4.4 State versus customers in risk-bearing 
From the point of view of investors, it matters little whether construction risks are borne by 
the state or by customers, so long as in the latter case the legal framework is clear and robust. 
The state can take on construction risk by i) offering a guarantee; or ii) by taking an equity 
stake.  
i) state guarantee: provided credible risk-bearing, a state guarantee would be a 
contingent liability on the government’s balance sheet and would be highly visible; it acts 
similarly to the role of a US regulator, meaning that keeping some incentives with the 
investors is necessary but the benefit in lower cost of capital is maximised. 
ii) equity stake: unless 100% (in which case there are no private investors) an equity 
stake provides only incomplete risk-bearing as it reduces the scale of the private investor 
commitment but doesn’t cap the construction risk; it appears on the state balance sheet and is 
highly visible. 
The government’s marginal cost of funding will always be the lowest in the economy 
(at least for most governments not at extreme risk of sovereign default), so if this is used as 
the discount rate for any project it will minimise the cost. But the cost of capital for a project 
(in an efficient capital market with well diversified investors) is driven by the project risk, not 
by the ability of the investor to borrow. The project risk also includes the risk that the 
company or the special purpose vehicle will default, and that the government will rule the 
project unacceptable (as in various governments imposing retrospective nuclear taxes or 
forcing shut-down or project abandonment). Again, Avner Offer’s credit time horizon 
captures the notion that the longer the duration that the investor is at risk, the greater the 
perceived risk that the investment will be impaired or expropriated. 
If the government takes on risk, that risk has an implicit price, which would crystallise 
as a flow of public spending if the project costs exceed the level where the guarantee is 
triggered. In the Green Book, this is best handled as optimism bias (HMT, 2018, ch5 and A5). 
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Merely discounting the original estimated cost at the government’s marginal cost of funding 
fails to capture this risk, which is a genuine risk that should be accepted and included. Indeed 
what should happen for a new project design is that a maximum reasonable cost overrun 
should be financed upfront to avoid having to reopen the financing for a project when it is 
within the range of optimism bias (which might be of the order of 25% in the case of a 
nuclear power plant).13 The cost of holding this finance and of incentivising the constructor 
companies not to use it unless necessary is likely to be small. 
6. A possible model for financing Sizewell C	
Appendix D sets out a model of funding based closely on the Thames Tideway Tunnel (TTT) 
model, with all flows in real terms14 and with sharing of cost over-runs up to a cap of 130% 
of the agreed construction cost. The RAB would be increased in line with investment until it 
reached the target construction cost (taken as £5,000/kW), and thereafter would only be 
incremented by 60% of the cost over-run, with the investors contributing the remaining 40% 
without a RAB-guaranteed return (up to the cap). The RAB and the agreed WACC paid on 
the RAB would be subject to periodic reviews by Ofgem. To ensure access to investment 
grade lending, gearing would be kept no higher than 70%. If the debt rate of interest is as 
high as 2% real15 and the equity risk premium is 5%, and setting β = 1 (thus ignoring the lack 
of correlation of construction risk with market returns), the return to equity would be 7% real 
and the implied WACC 3.5% real. Investors would receive a return on the RAB during 
construction, and would then be awarded a life-time (60-year) contract on commissioning. 
Ofgem would deliver this flow of funds by setting a strike price at the start of each new 
review period. 
In the base case in which the project is delivered on time and budget, the internal rate 
of return to the equity participants would be the required 7% (for good algebraic reasons set 
out in Appendix F). The levelised cost over the life at the WACC is £52.36/MWh and at the 
social discount rate (SDR) of 2% is £49.24/MWh.16 However, the levelised cost to consumers 
at the SDR is slightly higher as they have to prepay on the RAB during construction, and for 
them it is £49.6/MWh. If the strike price is set at periodic reviews every five years, then over 
the first period it would be set at £53.72/MWh. At the next review in year 15, the RAB has 
fallen to £4,583 and the strike price for the next period (years 16-20) would fall to 
                                                 
13 HMT recommends optimism bias adjustments of 25% for a non-standard engineering project. See 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/191
507/Optimism_bias.pdf at p. 2. 
14 Commercial evaluation is done at prices of the day and nominal WACCs to better model tax 
payments, and possibly front end in real terms a constant nominal flow of depreciation expenditures. 
15 The TTT rate was set at 1.8% above UK 10-year indexed gilts, that are now significantly negative, 
as figure 1 shows. 
16 This accumulates customer payments during construction  at the WACC or SDR to the date of 
commissioning and then discounts the customer payments thereafter, dividing by the NPV to 
commissioning of the output over the life (in the base case at the rate of 8 MWh/kWyr for 60 years). It 
is not the same as levelising the strike prices, which ignores the consumer payments during 
construction. 
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£51.90/MWh with the depreciating value of the RAB, and then decreasingly rapidly to 
£33.67/MWh from year 66 to 70.  
This can be contrasted with a counterfactual case in which the entire construction is 
financed by Sizewell C (SZC) much as in the case of HPC (assuming that it would be 
possible to find a comparably large source of risky finance). In this case effectively the entire 
revenue would be at risk and the required return or WACC is assumed to be 8%. The asset 
value at completion and including interest during construction would be £7,243/kW, even if 
delivered on time and budget. For ease of comparison in this counterfactual, SZC would have 
to earn the WACC and cover depreciation over the following 60 years. The constant (real) 
strike price to deliver this return is £96/MWh, or 194% of the RAB levelised cost (at the 
SDR). The levelised cost of transferring the asset value into a fund paying just the SDR 
would be £81/MWh. Assuming that the CfD strike price were held constant (at £96/MWh), 
the first year clear cash-flow would be £465/kWyr after paying depreciation, or an immediate 
return of 6.4%, rising as the capital value is depreciated. As SZC bears all the risk, consumers 
are protected through the pre-agreed CfD price (unless the project went into administration 
with a renegotiated and presumably more expensive replacement contract). 
In the worst case scenario (described in Appendix D)  in which the project is eight 
years late and 48% over budget, but with the cost over-run capped, the value of Ofgem 
assuring the allowed RAB (which is 80% of the total undiscounted construction cost) is that it 
provides a remarkably high internal return to SZC’s shareholders (of 5.8%). The levelised 
cost to consumers (including the publicly financed extra capital cost) over its lifetime would 
be £64/MWh at the social discount rate (2%). 
 
7. Public Support 
Any decision to move ahead with a RAB model for nuclear will depend on the wider political 
economy considerations and support for socialising costs for nuclear power. Nuclear power is 
a less popular option than other low-carbon options such as offshore wind; nevertheless, the 
UK public is broadly supportive of nuclear power and, unlike several other major European 
countries, that support has actually increased in recent years (Kim et al., 2014).  Indeed, 
outside of central and eastern Europe, the UK has the highest levels of support for nuclear 
power.  NGO support (or rather lack of strong opposition) is also notably different from most 
of western Europe.   
There is ample evidence of generalised support for nuclear energy alongside other 
low-carbon options, or at least what Corner et al. (2011) describe as ‘reluctant acceptance’.  
Since 2012, the quarterly BEIS/DECC tracker surveys have found that the views of the 
British public have remained quite consistent with roughly 35-40% of the public supportive 
(less than 10% strongly supportive) and 20-25% opposed (less than 10% strongly opposed) 
with the remaining 40% or so neutral (BEIS, 2018).  The results differ greatly by 
demographic group – men, older people and those of a higher social grade all tend to be more 
supportive of nuclear power (Yu et al., 2018). 
In terms of financing, there is relatively little evidence of public preferences, but a 
recent study by the UK Energy Research Centre (Demski et al., 2019) found that although a 
majority supported a transition to low-carbon energy sources, when asked how to divide up 
responsibility for paying for that transition, the expectation was that industry would take the 
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lead.  Asked to allocate responsibility for funding for new low-carbon generation, 
respondents believed almost half of the cost should be borne by industry and that government 
should pay for almost 30% from existing tax revenues, compared with only 10% coming 
from new tax revenues or and another 10% from future UK residents through government 
borrowing or debt.  
There is the additional issue of whether it is acceptable to spread the risk of low-
carbon investments over consumers. The Government clearly considers this valid for 
financing renewables, even though there is a good public good case for saying that the 
learning externalities are a global public good that should better be financed from general 
revenue (Newbery, 2018). Ofgem passes the cost of its Network Innovation Competitions 
(NIC) (Ofgem, 2019) on to consumer bills, on the grounds that it will benefit future 
consumers more than the current subsidy, and that is very much the case here although the 
NIC only costs £70 million/yr. Of course, as outlined at the start, there are many different 
possible investments, a number of which might be credibly supported using a RAB model 
(hydrogen, CCS transport and storage, pumped hydro, etc) and so even the most ardent 
supporter will need to justify why a particular investment should be prioritised using such an 
approach relative to other possible investments.  
More generally, there has also been increased attention to nationalisation (or 
renationalisation) in the energy sector, particularly coming from the Labour Party leadership 
in the UK.  Support for interventions such as nationalising energy companies has remained 
quite high (41% in 2014 and 39% in 2017) even as concerns over energy prices declined 
significantly over that same period (Rogers de Waal and Reiner, 2017).  Although support for 
nationalisation varies both by industry and across the population (notably by political party 
affiliation) (Smith, 2017), overall there is widespread support for some state involvement in 
the energy sector, although there are differences as whether that means local energy firms, a 
state-owned competitor or renationalisation.  This has led to a number of more radical 
policies gaining currency, for example, the Labour Party has recently suggested bringing 
National Grid back into state ownership to facilitate the low-carbon transition (Monaghan, 
2019).  Perhaps more surprisingly, some in the private sector frustrated with the inability to 
finance their projects, including the Chairman of Hitachi, which recently cancelled their 
proposed Wylfa project, have suggested nationalisation with regard to nuclear power might 
be a preferable alternative.17 
 
8. Conclusion  
The Government has in the past committed to a significant new nuclear construction 
programme to replace the impending retirement of the existing fleet. Looking further ahead 
beyond 2030 and providing costs can be contained, nuclear looks to be an important part of 
the electricity generation mix in the UK. National Grid’s only two Future Energy Scenarios 
for 2050 that meet the UK’s 2050 carbon reduction target (Community Renewables and Two 
                                                 
17 The Chairman of Hitachi, Hiroaki Nakashini declared : “Nationalisation is the only path” at the 
World Economic Forum at Davos, Switzerland. AFP (2019). “Hitachi wants nationalisation of UK 
nuclear project: report”, 24 January. 
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Degrees) both show substantial new nuclear by 2050 (7.9 GW and 16.6 GW respectively) 
with 2050 carbon intensities of 32 and 20 gm CO2/kWh respectively (National Grid, 2019). 
Given the recent cancellations of proposed British nuclear projects, projections for nuclear 
penetration in the intervening years have been scaled back, nevertheless the recent 
introduction of a net zero target in the UK raises the ultimate need for baseload zero-carbon 
technologies even more (to 18.6 GW in the FES 2019 Net Zero sensitivity analysis).   
Delivering that new nuclear will require a change in the form government support 
compared to HPC, but to a model that has been shown to attract private finance for 
infrastructure projects such as the Thames Tideway Tunnel. This model can deliver an 
acceptable national and electricity consumer cost, provided there is a regulatory guarantee to 
enable the RAB to be financed with investment grade debt, which would be passed through to 
electricity consumers at a cost of slightly higher initial consumer bills, but substantial savings 
once the stations are commissioned. To encourage non-infrastructure specialist funders such 
as pension funds, the Government would provide backstop equity funding above an agreed 
cost over-run, here assumed to be 30%. This hybrid RAB model appears the most promising, 
and arguably the only feasible way to deliver new nuclear build, which, we have argued, is 
cost-effective at the appropriate and now low discount rates and a likely essential component 
of meeting the increasingly challenging decarbonisation target. 
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Appendix A  Discounting and climate change mitigation 
 
Public economics is concerned to guide the choice of policies, including tax and expenditure. 
In its modern form (used, e.g. in the UK Government’s Appraisal Manual, HMT, 2018) it 
assumes the existence of a social welfare function, that measures the desirability of outcomes 
in terms of the improvements of welfare/well-being to individuals in the polity now and in 
the future. The relevant polity may be the country, or, for collective climate change action, 
the world. Welfare for individual economic outcomes is normally taken to be a function of 
consumption, U(cht), where cht is consumption per equivalent adult h at time t. If U(.) is a 
utility function, then current social welfare, W0, is the sum over the relevant population:  
W0 = ΣhU(cht).      (A1) 
Mitigating climate change requires actions now, including long-term investment plans 
with delayed future impacts on welfare, and the relevant inter-temporal measure is the utility 
discounted sum of future utilities, W:  
W = Σh,tU(cht)/(1+δ)t  or ∫ΣhU(cht)e-δtdt.      (A2) 
The two critical issues to settle are the choice of the utility function, U(cht), and the 
choice of the utility discount rate or rate of pure time preference, δ. There are attractions in 
using a constant elasticity utility function of the form  
U(ch) = (ch1-η)/(1-η),      (A3) 
where η is the elasticity of marginal utility. Equation (A3) conveniently has the same 
functional form as the utility that measures attitudes to risk, with η the coefficient of relative 
risk aversion. If so, and if consumption per head were to grow on average at rate g so that 
consumption in year t were c0(1+g)t or c0egt then the social discount rate s is  
s = δ +ηg.      (A4) 
From now on we take η = 1, which is equivalent to taking U(ch) = log(ch), also assumed by 
Stern (2007). Briefly, there are two arguments to be so specific. The first is that most 
perceptions (seeing, hearing, etc.) are logarithmic (e.g. sound is measured in dB, which is a 
logarithmic scale). The ethical argument arises when making comparisons between people, as 
the increase in well-being of a transfer of £1 to person h is measured by the marginal utility 
of consumption of that person, dU(ch)/dch ≡ U′( ch) = 1/ch. This means that making a small 
transfer to someone with an income twice that of another is only considered half as socially 
valuable as giving it to the other person. A direct implication is that most countries need to 
put a value on a life saved for allocating medical procedures or investing to reduce traffic 
accidents, and these are normally related to per capita consumption within the country, as that 
measures the country’s ability to pay for these activities. Call this monetary value Vk = αck, 
where ck is per capita consumption in country k. When making global decisions on climate 
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change with different impacts across the globe, the logarithmic welfare function implies that 
the (global) social value of a life is the same in all countries, equal to Wk = αck.U′(ck) = αck./ck 
= α, the same in every country. With these assumptions  
s = δ +g.      (A5) 
The rate of pure time preference is similarly an ethical choice, reflecting the weight 
we attach to the welfare of future generations. Many have argued that ethically they should be 
treated equally, so there should be no discounting just because their welfare happens in the 
future, rather than somewhere else now, so δ = 0. Others including Stern argue that there is 
some chance of global disaster (asteroids, pandemics, …) and that δ = 0.1%, equivalent to a 
10% chance of extinction in a century, or a 50% chance of the human species surviving for 
700 years. The UK Government (HMT, 2018) in its Green Book takes δ = 1% for short time 
horizons (which gives humanity only a 33% chance of surviving a century), but considers a 
rate of zero for long-term projects. 
The final assumption is a reasonable rate of growth over long periods of time for per 
capita consumption, where there is some consensus around Stern’s value of 1.3% p.a. 
(accepted by Cline, 1992, and Nordhaus, 2007). Together this gives a social discount rate of 
1.4%. The rate used for long-term discounting by the UK Government was reduced after the 
Stern Report from 2.5% to 2.14% (after 75 years), and from 1% over 300 years to 0.86% 
(HMT, 2018). 
 
Future inequality 
The implicit assumption above is that the consumption of all agents grows at the same rate, g. 
There are good grounds for considering that climate change will have differential impacts 
across the planet, and that the coefficient of variation of consumption, σ, might grow. It can 
be shown that this reduces the social discount rate, although the effect is arguably small. 
Compared to equation (A5), if σ2 grows by Δσ2 over T years, then the social discount rate 
becomes  
s = δ +ηg - ½Δσ2(η + η2)/T.     (A6) 
If Δσ2 = 10% over 50 years, and η = 1, then the social discount rate is reduced by 
10%/50 or by 0.2%, lowering the Stern estimate from 1.4% to 1.3%. 
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Appendix B   Risk and Incentives 
The main concern with risk sharing is that it blunts the incentives to manage costs. If the 
company took none of the risk of cost and time over-runs, the worry is that it would have 
insufficient incentive to manage and reduce that risk. If at the other extreme it bore all of the 
risk, the resulting weighted average cost of capital (the WACC) would be much higher, even 
assuming it was financeable. The obvious question is what is the appropriate degree of risk-
sharing purely from an incentive viewpoint? 
B1. Risk and the cost of capital 
One way to model this is to suppose that the degree of risk impacts the equity share, while 
leaving the interest on debt (at 2%) and the equity risk premium (at 5%) unaffected (although 
beyond some point, more risk would likely increase the WACC beyond this).1 Thus if the 
equity share is α and the debt share (1- α), the resulting WACC is α.7% + (1 – α).2% in real 
terms (all prices and interest rates will be real in this discussion). Thus if α = 20%, the 
WACC is 3%, rising to a notional 7% at α = 100%, and for α = 50%, the WACC is 4.5%.  
B1.1 Assumptions 
Suppose that the target cost of constructing Sizewell C (SZC) is £5,000/kW for a construction 
period of 10 years to commissioning. This is based on the claim that SZC is an almost exact 
replica of HPC, for which costs are now reasonably well identified, and with a construction 
team that comes with experience of constructing HPC. For other as yet unbuilt (in the UK) 
designs a cost and time over-run of 25% would provide a better base case. However, given 
the implausibility (at least in the eyes of potential investors of no cost over-runs, we consider 
a 25% and a 50% over-run. Cost and construction time are likely highly correlated, so 
suppose that the rate of expenditure is £500/kW/yr so the total overnight cost is £500.T/kW 
for T ≤ 10 is the construction time in years.  
Suppose that the plant life after that is 60 years, and that it averages 8,000 full output 
operating hours per year. Even if decommissioning costs were as high as £900/kW2 incurred 
20 years after shutdown and even with zero discounting, the average decommissioning costs 
over the output of the plant, would be £15/kWyr or less than £2/MWh, so it is reasonable to 
take the total operating costs (O&M, fuel and decommissioning) as £22.50/MWh,3 
                                                 
1 In the counterfactual case considered in Appendix D in which SZC bears all the risk, the WACC is 
taken as 8%. 
2 Lévêque (2015) gives figures from France estimated at €300/kW but a high-end estimate for 
Germany of €1,000/kW or £900/kW. OECD (2016) gives estimates for three generic large PWRs with 
decommissioning costs ranging from $390-$1,211/kW, with an average of $2013668/kW or roughly 
£2018800/kW. In practice decommissioning costs would be spread over a longer period. 
3 EIA data 2007-2017, in converted at current £, at constant UK prices is roughly £20/MWh, from 
https://www.eia.gov/electricity/annual/html/epa_08_04.html, costs from BEIS (2016) at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/beis-electricity-generation-costs-november-2016 are 
£23/MWh, which includes £2/MWh for decommissioning and waste, while £22.50/MWh is EdF’s  
working assumption (also including decommissioning). 
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B2. Required strike price or levelised cost 
Figure B1 shows the relationship between the construction time and associated overnight4 
cost and the levelised cost (or the required real wholesale price) over a 60-year life at 
different WACCs, which would be covered by a Contract-for-Difference (CfD) with an 
indexed strike price.5 If a strike price of less than £70/MWh is taken as the acceptance 
criterion, then a 10% cost increase on the 10 year construction period, T, and a two year over-
run (with a 12% increase in overnight cost) are both viable at a WACC of 4.5% (50% 
gearing) but a five year over-run is only marginally viable at the base WACC of 3.5%.  
 
Figure B1 Levelised cost against WACC for different construction periods (T) 
 
Figure B2 shows the relationship between the present value of the gross profit (sales 
revenue less operating costs) discounted date zero (start of construction) and the equity share 
(which determines the WACC) for different strike prices and construction periods (T) of 10 
or 15 years. The line labelled “capex” is the cost including interest during construction (IdC) 
at the WACC that the revenue needs to cover, also discounted to the start of construction. The 
equity share is shown notionally rising to 120% which corresponds to the higher WACC of 
8% needed for SZC to take on all the risk. 
The present value of the resulting revenue stream depends on the sales price of 
electricity. At a wholesale electricity price of £70/MWh, the discounted value of gross profits 
                                                 
4 i.e. the simple sum of investments ignoring interest during construction (IdC). The graphs discount 
everything to the start of construction and so include IdC. 
5 The graphs are derived assuming income and expenditure flows and discounting are done in 
continuous time using the formulae in Appendix F. The spreadsheets are available via links on the 
EPRG WP site. There will be small differences with annual flows and discount factors. Graph B1 is 
eq(6) of Appendix F. 
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over the life of the plant with an equity share of 30% (WACC = 3.5%) is £6,714/kW, to be 
compared with the discounted cost of construction of £4,219/kW. If, on the other hand the 
equity share rises to 70% (WACC = 5.5%) the discounted value falls to £4,689/kW (although 
the construction cost also falls to £3,846). Putting it another way, at an equity share of 70% 
the required strike price is about £70/MWh, while reducing the equity share to 30% would 
allow the strike price to be reduced to about £52/MWh, a reduction of about 25% in the cost 
to the consumer. To deliver a strike price of £52/MWh at an equity share of 70% would 
require a cost reduction of 37% (from an overnight cost of £5,000/kW to £3,140/kW). It is 
difficult to believe that increasing the risk such that the equity share had to rise from 30% to 
70% would deliver such a massive cost reduction. 
 
  Figure B2 Relationship between present value of gross profit and equity share 
 
We can present the same information as the required percentage saving in cost to 
compensate for each 10% increase in the equity share (corresponding to a 0.5% increase in 
the WACC up to 7.5% increasing to 8%), for the two extreme construction periods T = 10 
and 15 years.  The higher the expected future price of electricity, the more valuable it is 
discounted to the present, and hence the higher would have to be the incentive saving in 
construction cost to warrant the higher WACC. Moving from the base case equity share of 
30% (WACC = 3.5%) to an equity share of 40% (WACC = 4%) requires a cost reduction of 
between 9% and 18% (depending on the strike price and construction period) to justify the 
increase in risk share. The required cost reduction falls as the risk share rises, so the cost 
reduction required to offset a shift from 70% equity (WACC = 5.5%) to 80% (WACC = 6%) 
is between 5% and 11%. 
The implication is that the Government or Ofgem under-writing a large share of the 
risk (by, for example, allowing a share of cost over-runs to be passed through to consumers 
so that the company takes only a part) is likely to be very cost effective. Perhaps surprisingly, 
the benefit of further lowering the risk rises the more risk is removed from the company. 
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Figure B3 Amount construction cost would have to fall as a result of raising the equity share 
 
Providing incentives for timely delivery, which also on our assumptions keep costs 
down, is important as delays reduce the present value of future revenues. It may impose 
additional costs on the industry if it requires more expensive alternatives to make up a period 
of inadequate supply (e.g. by building more carbon intensive less efficient replacement plant 
that can be delivered more rapidly, but will then be displaced by the eventual commissioning 
of the planned nuclear station).  
 
B3.  Conclusion on incentives 
Incentives matter, but for capital intensive projects with lengthy time periods and a long life, 
the cost in terms of higher WACCs seem to overwhelm the possible benefits of cost 
reduction, arguing for very low risks and extensive risk sharing. If incentives to reduce cost 
can be delivered without putting more financial risk on the company, for example by 
facilitating site approval, not intervening to require design changes, and encouraging 
experienced construction teams to be transferred from one site to another with minimal 
disruption, these would seem to be far more cost effective than a hands-off financial 
incentive. 
Furthermore, there is an additional layer of scrutiny on the project under the RAB model. 
There is an economic regulator, Ofgem, checking behaviour, governance procedures etc., 
acting in the interests of customers to ensure costs do not overrun unnecessarily. The 
regulator provides an additional incentive in that if the investors were not sufficiently 
incentivised to be efficient, the regulator could disallow costs that were demonstrably the 
fault of the investor. The quid pro quo of sharing risk with customers is that the customers 
have the regulator overseeing the investors whose job it is to monitor / drive / challenge 
efficiency.  
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Appendix C Possibilities for private financing of new nuclear power 
stations in the UK 
C1. Infrastructure as an asset class for institutional investors 
Infrastructure is increasingly regarded as an asset class (see e.g. G20 et al., 2018) meaning 
that it has definable investment characteristics that make it suitable for a structured portfolio 
allocation process. The idea of an asset class is rather loose: arguable the only fundamental 
asset classes are equity and debt. Proponents of infrastructure as an asset class argue that 
these assets are typically long term, relatively low risk (meaning low volatility of returns) and 
possibly well hedged against inflation risk. The low risk is supposed to come from the fact 
that infrastructure assets are typically either monopolistic or at least have high barriers to 
entry and usually involve low risk of technical obsolescence. Any given asset may not fully 
meet these criteria and there are plenty of disaster stories where political risk (which is 
typically higher for infrastructure assets than conventional commercial assets) more than 
offsets the lower risk factors.1 
Infrastructure assets may be invested in through both equity and debt. Equity may be 
listed (buying shares in a quoted company that owns infrastructure assets, such as an electric 
utility) or unlisted (meaning it is a form of private equity, shares owned in a company or fund 
that it not quoted on a stock exchange). The debt may be in the form of loan or a bond, the 
latter being potentially quoted on a market and/or having transferrable ownership. 
Infrastructure assets may additionally be classified according to the investment stage. 
Completed assets that have no development or construction risk are often termed 
“brownfield” assets and these are the ones that are usually argued to be low risk. But 
investors can also put money into “greenfield” projects, meaning they take some or all of the 
development and construction risk. This stage of investment is much riskier than buying a 
completed, operating asset and has proven less appealing to institutional investors. 
Critics (e.g. Inderst, 2010) of the concept of infrastructure as an asset class point to the 
heterogeneity of infrastructure assets and the lack of any financial theory to justify treating 
infrastructure as different. Much of the research on this question is from interested parties, 
either investment managers or investment index providers. But institutional investors do 
appear increasingly to treat infrastructure as an asset class, separate from real estate and 
conventional private equity. So even if the theoretical case for thinking of infrastructure as an 
asset class is dubious, it seems to have an operational importance which means that those 
seeking to finance infrastructure are encouraged to frame their arguments accordingly. 
 
C1.2  The general case for investing in infrastructure assets 
The general case for any asset class is that it contributes portfolio diversification, meaning 
that it is imperfectly correlated with the other portfolio assets and therefore reduces the 
overall risk for a given return, or equivalently raises expected return for a given level of risk. 
A number of studies argue that infrastructure meets this test. 
                                                 
1 Enron’s Dhabol power project in India is a cautionary tale. 
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Most infrastructure investment is held through private equity, which normally means there is 
little or no public information. Even when the returns are published, they are subject to the 
general problem of private equity returns reporting, which is that if the returns are only 
quoted periodically, they may give the appearance of low volatility relative to for example 
daily quoted returns from listed financial assets. But this is an artefact of the reporting 
frequency. 
Australian and Canadian institutional investors have been pioneers in infrastructure 
investing. Two studies (Peng and Newell, 2007, and Newell et al., 2011) draw on data from 
1996-2005 on unlisted investments by Australian funds to conclude that infrastructure assets 
contribute significant portfolio diversification benefits. The authors find that unlisted 
infrastructure had a Sharpe ratio (a standard measure of investment return per unit of risk) of 
1.47 (where anything over 1 is regarded as good) compared with public equities’ Sharpe ratio 
of 0.67.  
A variety of index providers now offer investable infrastructure indices, where the 
constituents are companies that have a high exposure to infrastructure assets. Standard and 
Poors argue that inclusion of such an index improves the efficiency of a portfolio that 
otherwise invests in standard asset classes such as public equities, government bonds and 
corporate bonds.2 Center Square, a subsidiary of the US bank BNY Mellon, argues that the 
FTSE Global Infrastructure Index contributes to the efficiency of a standard portfolio.  
Many infrastructure assets are utilities which are regulated using price controls. These 
often give the utility a degree of de facto inflation linkage in its revenue, which offers a 
partial inflation hedge for investors. Utilities can sell this inflation exposure in the swaps 
market (they swap an inflation-linked stream of cash flows for an unhedged stream of cash 
flows, typically mediated by banks) offering an alternative to inflation-linked bonds for 
investors who seek inflation protection. 
By contrast, Standard & Poors claim their inflation index provides partial protection 
(defined as higher returns than a broader equity index) for a portfolio during periods of high 
inflation (S&P Dow Jones Indices Research, 2015). 
C1.2 The specific case for defined benefit pension fund investors 
The case above works for any investor, in principle. But infrastructure assets may be 
particularly suitable for long term investors seeking modest risk returns. The biggest such 
class of investors is defined benefit pensions, which have liabilities to pay incomes linked to 
salaries, meaning their liabilities grow in line with wages, not with prices. (Once their clients 
have retired, the liabilities usually become indexed to price inflation and bear only that plus 
longevity risk – see section II for the value of inflation-linked assets to such funds, which 
make up a large fraction of the UK private sector pension fund universe). Regulation and 
public scrutiny tend to make such funds fairly risk averse, with trustees under pressure to 
show that they have very carefully thought through asset decisions. 
                                                 
2 S&P Dow Jones Indices Research, 2015. Approaches to Benchmarking Listed Infrastructure, April, 
at https://us.spindices.com/documents/research/research-approaches-to-benchmarking-listed-
infrastructure.pdf 
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If infrastructure assets match the liabilities of pension funds, we might expect to see a 
lot of investment but that is not the case. The 2018 edition of the annual OECD survey of 
large pension funds and public pension reserve funds (a mix of private and public sector 
pension schemes) finds that direct investment (unlisted equity and debt) in infrastructure was 
only 1.1% of the assets of the 49 schemes surveyed (OECD, 2018). Although many schemes 
expressed support for the idea of investing in principle, the allocations are dominated by 
Australia and Canada with a few other countries with higher investment proportions such as 
Portugal and the Netherlands, both in renewable energy. Many funds have no infrastructure 
investments at all, even in renewable energy. 
The report also shows the continuing attraction of brownfield versus greenfield 
investments, though some funds indicate a growing willingness to consider greenfield (new 
build) assets. Pension funds have a slow, careful decision process so these indications may 
take some time to turn into action. 
C1.3 Barriers to pension fund investment 
OECD (2018) suggests a number of barriers to pension fund investing including: novelty, 
lack of knowledge and experience, lack of data and lack of transparency. In sum, pension 
funds are used to investing in financial assets such as equities and bonds. They typically lack 
the skills and knowledge to appraise an infrastructure asset, each of which is unique and 
requires a lot more due diligence than a typical large quoted company share.  
The knowledge barrier can be overcome at a cost, either by hiring a team or by buying 
the expertise of a specialist infrastructure fund, of which there are now many. But pension 
funds have been unwilling to pay the fees and in most case are too small to justify setting up 
a dedicated in-house team, especially among the UK’s relatively fragmented pension fund 
sector. 
In specific sectors an external solution can work. The Green Investment Bank helped 
to get investors used to what were initially novel assets (mainly offshore wind turbines) 
before being privatised in a sale to Macquarie Bank. This has led to suggestions that the UK 
would benefit from a broader infrastructure bank, particularly in light of the expected loss of 
access of the UK to the European Investment Bank (EIB). The EIB is available to EU 
member states and provides both low cost finance and a source of infrastructure investment 
expertise. It is very likely that the UK will no longer have access to it after leaving the EU. 
C1.4 Infrastructure versus private equity: how to get lower expected returns 
Many pension funds now invest in private equity (PE), which means unlisted corporate 
equity. This shows that they are in principle willing to invest in infrastructure type assets but 
the problem is the mismatch in expected returns.  
Typically PE investing is done through a fund run by managing partners, with a ten 
year life. The fund aims to buy undervalued companies and make them more valuable, then 
sell them at a profit, with the fund being wholly liquidated. The ten year fund life provides 
time for this strategy to work, with the assurance to the managers that the external (or 
“limited” partners) cannot ask for their money back early (though they may be able to sell to 
new investors). The expected return needs to compensate for the illiquidity of the investment, 
as well as the risk involved in the strategy. 
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These investments can include infrastructure (which is confusingly sometimes seen as 
a separate asset class to private equity, when if in fact largely overlaps with it).  
The problem is that private equity expected returns are typically higher than public 
equity returns, not least because of the illiquidity compensation. But the case for 
infrastructure investing is that it is low risk and the project sponsors need to attract funds 
seeking lower returns than those normally associated with private equity. 
The challenge then is to harness pension funds’ proven willingness to tie up their 
funds for 10 years or more in illiquid investments, but for lower return investments. 
1. The Thames Tideway Tunnel (TTT) model for infrastructure investment 
The TTT model for attracting private debt and equity investment into a large infrastructure 
project has been successful (although the project is not yet complete) and therefore offers a 
potential model for other major infrastructure projects such as new nuclear.3 
The TTT model is a successful combination of two key components: 
i) harnessing the existing credibility and track record of the regulatory asset base 
(RAB) approach to regulated utility investment; and 
ii) managing risks by using government guarantees to take away extremely remote or 
“tail” risks. 
These two features can be used in other projects and, in principle, for traditionally 
non-regulated, non-monopoly assets such as nuclear power generation. 
TTT is a £4.2 billion4 construction project to build a large new sewer for London. 
Thames Water, the regulated water and sewerage utility for London, was unable to finance 
such a large project on its balance sheet and the government decided that it could be financed 
instead by a standalone third- party company. The goal was to keep the benefits of private 
involvement (incentives for efficient delivery) with a minimum of state involvement. 
The new asset is owned by a company called (in recognition of a key historic figure in 
London’s sewerage system) Bazalgette Tunnel plc, which has four shareholders, all 
institutional investors with expertise in infrastructure investment. 
The project was developed by Thames Water, which invested £1.1 billion to get it to a 
fully specified and costed project that just required financing before construction could begin. 
The asset will interconnect with Thames’s existing assets but remain fully owned by 
Bazalgette.  
As with most infrastructure assets, which are very capital intensive and have long 
construction periods and operating lives, the key cost is the cost of capital. So reducing the 
cost of capital is key to reducing the costs ultimately borne by customers. 
The TTT structure extends the concept of regulatory asset base5 (RAB) to a separate 
asset owned, not by a regulated utility company, but by an independent company. The RAB 
is the book value of the net assets in the regulated business, as recognised by the regulator 
and therefore eligible for an appropriate rate of return. It may be quite different from the 
                                                 
3 Data on the TTT model are taken from the presentation to potential bond investors 
https://www.tideway.london/media/1579/bond-investor-presentation-may-2016.pdf  
4 Unless otherwise specified, figures are in 2014/15 prices. 
5 The term Regulatory Capital Value is also used, we treat them as interchangeable. 
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normal accounting book value. But so long as investors trust that the RAB will paid a fair 
return, they can base their investment decision on a comparison of the return with their 
perception of risk. 
Happily, investors are used to, and have confidence in, the way that the RAB is used 
by the energy regulator (Ofgem) and the water regulator (Ofwat) to pay returns to investors. 
Under the Water Act of 1989, the regulator is required to make sure that efficient utilities are 
able to finance their operations. After 30 years of operation, investors trust this approach, 
which involves the regulator setting water company allowable charges to provide a weighted 
average cost of capital (WACC), judged according to market information. In the event of a 
dispute, the Competition and Markets Authority is the court of appeal. 
The RAB model has achieved a high degree of legal certainty. It is seen by investors 
as more robust than either PFI projects (where there is always a risk of revocation of 
contracts and a potentially costly and messy process of compensation) or the concession 
approach, where an asset is, in effect, leased to a private investor. All this is despite the fact 
that, as Stern (2013) points out, the RAB does not appear in any primary legislation in the 
UK. 
(Ofwat has a goal of introducing competition into the water and sewerage industry 
where possible, so bringing a new third-party company into the industry met that goal, though 
this was a subordinate reason for using the RAB approach. To the extent that TTT brings 
additional operating data to the regulator it facilitates yardstick regulation but given the 
essential simplicity of TTT (it used gravity) this is probably not very significant in practice.) 
By treating the TTT asset in the same manner as Thames Water’s RAB or National 
Grid’s RAB, the new investment should have the same appeal to investors. But the large 
scale of the project meant that there was a level of construction risk that might discourage 
investors who would otherwise be attracted to low operating risk of the asset, once built. So, 
a second key part of the TTT financing involved a set of risk-sharing arrangements. 
First, a portion of the construction risk is shared with customers, which is added to the 
RAB and attracts the same return. This is set at 60% of cost over-runs, with 70% of 
underspend shared with customers. This is similar to the pain- and gain-sharing regulatory 
arrangements for new-build construction adding to water or energy network RABs in general, 
which are typically set at 50% of cost over- or under-spend. 
To remove the small risk of more extreme cost over-runs, which are a feature of many 
infrastructure projects, there is an upper bound on the investors’ total commitment at the level 
of 30% above the base case. If costs exceed that level, investors can choose to put further 
funds in, with the return on that incremental investment subject to negotiation with Ofwat. If 
they choose not to, then the government is committed to providing any additional funding in 
the form of “contingent equity”. This amounts to providing insurance for investors against 
what is known as “tail risk”, referring to the extreme right hand tail of a notional frequency 
distribution of cost outcomes. The idea is that this risk should be very small so that the 
government is unlikely to have to put in funds, but by taking away even the remote risks that 
the project either runs out of funds or investors are forced into unacceptably low returns, it 
makes the project appealing to institutional investors at a relatively low cost of capital. 
The RAB model is also well recognised in the credit markets, where investors and 
credit rating agencies trust the regulatory regime and can assess creditworthiness relatively 
 7
easily by comparing total net debt of a company with its RAB. The rule of thumb for 
achieving investment grade status (BBB or better for Standard & Poors for example) is a 
debt/RAB of no more than 70%.  
This simplicity is important. Infrastructure projects involving construction (as 
opposed to already built and operating) are quite complex, which is a barrier to investors who 
lack specialised infrastructure analysis teams. By reducing this risk to the familiar RAB 
model, a wider range of investors can be mobilised to lend to the project. Lending in 
traditional project finance, as used in a lot of private infrastructure around the world, is 
usually much more costly than for utility finance, partly because of the complexity of the 
project. TTT therefore managed to keep financing costs down compared with a non-RAB 
project approach. 
The equity investors, who still bear most of the risk, in line with the need for 
incentives to manage costs effectively, are specialists who should have the expertise to 
appraise the project in detail. 
The financing costs of TTT were the result of a competitive process. Two consortia 
bid for the right to finance the project, on the basis of the lowest WACC they needed to 
proceed. The winning WACC was 2.5% in real terms (indexed to the RPI). If the project is 
built on the target cost, the RAB will attract that overall return. This is broadly consistent 
with 4-5% cost of equity in real terms.  
Crucially for investor acceptance, the outcomes cannot deviate too far from that 
central case. Investors are assured that they will get some positive return even if the cost 
exceeds the threshold level of 130%. But in the most plausible best case, the returns will not 
be excessively high.  
This cap-and-collar on returns is attractive to institutional investors which seek 
reasonable, steady returns without too much risk. This includes a lot of pension fund 
investors and retail investor. It also meets the needs of equity yield funds which offer a 
combination of income with expected long term capital gains. 
By contrast, the project could have tapped into the class of higher return, more risk-
taking funds, including the large pool of private equity investors. These investors would not 
have needed so much risk protection but would have needed a much higher cost of capital as 
compensation. 
Additional risk mitigation features included the government providing £500m of debt 
in the event of financial markets disruption. Although viewed as unlikely to be needed, this 
was reportedly important to get investor commitment. 
C3.  Return on capital during construction 
An additional feature of the RAB approach that was important for attracting some (but not 
all) institutional investors is that the regulator allows a return on the RAB as soon as the 
capital is invested, amounting to a return on capital invested during construction. 
In financial terms, two sequences of financial flows with different timings can easily 
be compared and the required return calculated. So in theory there is a benefit to earlier 
financial payments that reduces the expected return, compared to the conventional project 
case when investors receive a return only when operation starts. 
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But the investment world is segmented, and income funds will typically not invest in 
assets with a long gap before returns, no matter how high the return is expected to be. By 
treating the TTT RAB just like the Thames Water RAB, investor appeal could be increased to 
include low risk but steady return investor, including institutions whose ultimate customers 
are retail investors seeking a steady or at least non-volatile cash yield. 
Additionally, many infrastructure equity funds are organised as temporary, closed-end 
private equity-style funds with a ten year life. For long construction period projects, the delay 
from investing to getting a return would be a barrier to these sorts of investors, even if the 
expected return was high. 
In sum, paying a return on the RAB, whether construction has finished or not, was an 
important part of the appeal for mobilising funds for TTT. 
Other features of the TTT project that helped it get financing were: 
i) investors had a lot of comparable information on tunnelling projects both in the 
UK6 and abroad, and so had confidence in the costs Thames had estimated and risks around 
them even if these comparators were not quite as complex as a major new tunnel under 
London;7 
ii) the project used a bespoke version of the RAB approach, for example the WACC is 
fixed for 15 years (the construction period)8 and only once operation starts will it be reset 
periodically in line with normal RAB assets; 
iii) Ofwat reportedly consulted debt rating agencies as well as commercial finance 
experts to ensure that the structure would be acceptable to private investors as well as 
meeting the regulator’s goals.  
As well as helping ensure sufficient private financing for the project, mobilising 
capital helped increase the level of competition to set the cost of capital. Increased 
competition thus helped reduce the cost of finance, to the benefit of consumers. 
C4.  Application of the TTT model to new nuclear: institutional investor attitudes 
The TTT project is potentially applicable to any large, discrete infrastructure investment 
which is too big for the existing regulated utility companies to manage. It would be a further 
extension to use it for non-monopoly regulated assets such as electricity generation, since 
these are usually seen as taking part in a competitive market. State support for renewable 
generation typically takes the form of a contract for differences (CFD) which provides ex-
post revenue certainty while leaving construction and operating risks with investors. That is 
also the approach used for Hinkley Point C but nuclear is arguably different in two respects: 
i) the sheer scale of investment is far larger than most other utility investment; and 
                                                 
6 The TTT finance marketing presentation cites Crossrail, another Thames Water project in the Lee 
Valley and a National Grid tunnelling project as evidence of tunnelling being a well understood 
practice. 
7 This was before the much-publicised problems of the Crossrail project, though those were not 
particularly related to tunnelling. 
8 We understand WACC is adjusted in construction so that it partially tracks changes in the market 
cost of debt. This provides a reduction in financing risk and also helps make the project more 
attractive for investors. 
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ii) the technology is proven in operation but lacks a recently proved construction 
record, to put it mildly. 
The UK offshore wind industry is a highly successful example of private design, 
construction, investment and operation under the umbrella of fixed price contracts, which 
may not even be needed for very much longer, as costs continue to fall. But nuclear is some 
way off meeting those conditions. Since the cost of capital is the key influence on nuclear 
electricity costs, it is worth considering how the TTT model might be applied. 
In principle, a new nuclear station (taking Sizewell C, SZC, as the most likely case) 
could be set up as a RAB project. Investors would bid a required return to finance the project, 
a range of cost outcomes would be established, and some threshold (“worst case”) level set, 
above which the state would provide contingent equity. The regulator Ofgem would charge 
customers an amount sufficient to pay the WACC during the construction phase, with a 
conventional five year periodic review thereafter.  
Conversations with a range of debt and equity investors suggest that all of this is 
feasible in principle.9 There are some important differences, but mostly not of principle. 
Scale: SZC construction costs are likely to be in the range of £15-18 billion, of which 
EDF is unlikely to be willing to fund more than 20%, leaving some £12-14 billion to be 
funded.10 It is not clear how much of this could come from the other current project owner 
CGN.  
Construction risk: unlike TTT, there are few direct precedents for SZC’s construction 
and most are discouraging; but there is, or will be, one very specific precedent, namely the 
construction of Hinkley Point C. If, as planned, SZC is an exact replica of Hinkley, with the 
same construction team and supply chain, then confidence in the construction risk should be 
very much higher than for HPC itself, which is the fifth of a kind EPR in the world but first in 
the UK. Depending on what stage of construction HPC has reached by the time of a financial 
decision on SZC, the construction risk should be much better known, though there will still 
be a tail risk that needs to be covered. Clearly, any setbacks at HPC would affect confidence 
in the SZC process. However, a critical point is that exact replication is only possible if 
construction of each stage of SZC follows on closely from the equivalent stage at HPC. Any 
decision to delay the start of construction at SZC – to ‘increase confidence’ by completing 
HPC first – will actually have the opposite effect, as it makes it more likely that design 
changes and equipment requalification will be required. 
ESG: a number of investors point to the need for all investment now to be approved 
by their internal Economic, Social and Governance (ESG) risk committee. These committees 
have mostly never had to consider a nuclear-related investment and so there is real 
uncertainty as to what they will say. New nuclear can make a strong claim to being consistent 
                                                 
9 The author (ST) interviewed a small number of UK institutional investors in debt (two insurance 
companies and a pension fund) and equity (two specialist infrastructure investment funds) plus a legal 
corporate advisor and two investment banking corporate advisors. The results are clearly indicative 
rather than statistically significant. 
10 We understand EDF wishes to have no more than 20% of the equity long term, which would be a 
much lower figure than the total share of financing, assuming the project had a long term 65/45 
debt/equity financing ratio. 
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with environmental goals in respect of climate change but the matters of nuclear waste and of 
safety would need to be considered. Most investors were fairly confident that this would not 
be a significant barrier, but pointed out that some infrastructure investment funds explicitly 
exclude nuclear from their scope. 
Credit rating agency views: similarly, credit rating agencies would need to consider 
whether being in the nuclear sector would make any important difference to their evaluation. 
It is probably essential for the project to have an investment grade rating to attract the debt 
investors on the scale needed (though some larger UK institutions are now quite happy to 
lend without ratings, having their own in-house credit rating teams). The majority investor 
view was that the rating agencies would look at the credit risk on its merits and would not 
apply any nuclear-specific additional terms, but this is not certain. 
 
C4.1 Tapping UK debt markets: the mature pension fund sector 
An important feature of the UK institutional funds industry is the large proportion of mature 
pension funds, meaning that most of their members are retired and the fund’s key obligation 
is to pay them pensions which are usually indexed (to some extent) to inflation, usually the 
RPI.  Unlike in the growth phase of pension funds, the key risks to be managed are inflation 
and longevity risk (the risk that people die later than forecast). This creates a demand for 
inflation-linked assets at a time when such assets are in limited supply. 
There is already a swaps market for inflation-linked cash flows, mostly supplied by 
regulated utilities that have natural inflation exposure. But mature pension funds need new 
inflation linked assets, so any project that can issue inflation linked debt, particularly at long 
maturities, should find ready demand. This provides an opportunity for SZC to tap the UK 
debt markets at some scale. Although UK inflation indexing is moving towards CPI as a 
benchmark, there remain many outstanding RPI-linked liabilities which require hedging with 
RPI-linked assets, so it may be best to issue both types of index-linked debt. 
Other points arising from investor conversations include: 
- the need for “skin in the game” from the major project sponsors, chiefly EDF; but a 
20% equity stake (and a 25% interest in the supply chain) would amply meet this need, since 
the key thing is for the sponsor to face a material financial incentive, which need not mean a 
large equity share so long as the absolute amount is material. EDF’s key role is seen in the 
operating phase. 
- foreign investor demand, hitherto likely to be large for good quality UK credit risks, 
is now in doubt because of the combination of Brexit-related uncertainty and the 
unquantifiable threat of a new Labour government pledging to renationalise utility assets, 
possibly below market or even RAB values; whether that pledge would extend to projects 
such as SZC is very unclear but the wider damage amounts to a higher risk premium for any 
UK investment and a decision by more risk averse foreign investors to avoid the UK 
altogether for the foreseeable future. 
- given the lack of familiarity with nuclear investment, an “education” programme 
would be needed to build confidence among investors (including but not limited to the ESG 
committees). 
- there is a large pool of equity infrastructure funds, many of which have “dry 
powder” (uninvested funds) owing to a lack of suitable projects; many of these funds exclude 
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greenfield (construction) projects but are very keen to find suitable operating assets, and 
could provide demand for the equity of the project, but only after operation has started; that 
means it may be harder to find the initial equity but those early investors could probably sell 
at a profit once construction has finished. 
- the scale of SZC’s financing needs makes it unlikely that the TTT model of 
competing consortia would work; but other methods, including book-building (an auction-
based approach routinely used in securities issuance) could offer a way to bring competition 
into the process. 
- the credibility of the construction plan was critical to TTT’s ability to achieve 
investor financing on competitive terms; likewise it will be essential for SZC to be able to 
offer a credible plan.  
-compared with TTT, the need for equity at the construction phase is probably larger 
because the construction risk will almost certainly be perceived as larger. This implies a 
higher cost of capital. But once the project is completed that cost of capital will fall. This is 
true for any construction project but much more so for nuclear build. The question of whether 
the ex ante cost of capital that investors would bid initially might appear unduly favourable 
ex post once construction is completed needs addressing. This problem is familiar from the 
PFI world and was addressed through a combination of ex post gain-sharing on the 
refinancing after construction and in PFI2 the idea that the client (local or central 
government) would put in a share of the equity. As the NAO (2017a) noted, putting in equity 
was somewhat in conflict with the point of using private finance in the first place. 
- TTT is a relatively simple operating asset compared with a nuclear power station; 
those investors familiar with nuclear are confident that the typical operating record of PWRs 
and of EDF is very good, and that investors can become comfortable with the operating risk 
in the same way that they have in a relatively short time got used to the operating risk of 
offshore wind turbines (where wind risk was a new concept for most investors, for example). 
Some UK investors will have the unhappy memory of the operating performance of the UK 
AGRs but this is a matter that needs to be differentiated from the wider nuclear operating 
record, through education; by the time SZC faces a financial decision there should be three or 
possibly four operating EPRs in the world. 
- although the overall TTT structure provides a workable template, the detail of the 
equivalent risk-sharing in construction and the “threshold” for government-provided 
contingent equity will be the nub of any viable structure; anecdotally it appears the TTT 
equity investors believed there was a reasonable chance of beating the construction costs of 
the TTT central case, which was perceived to be somewhat conservative (risk-averse); for 
SZC it is rather less likely that the risks will be seen to be symmetrical around a central case, 
unless of course the central case is chosen to be very pessimistic; in essence, there will be less 
information on which to base a rational analysis of the SZC construction outcomes and so 
more room for differences of opinion. 
- a key part of the early financing for TTT came from the European Investment Bank 
(EIB) (£0.7 billion); building early momentum is important for financing large projects and 
the EIB role was very helpful; assuming EIB financing is no longer available to the UK after 
Brexit, lining up one or more initial “anchor” lenders would be very helpful to building 
confidence among other potential lenders. 
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C5.  Conclusion 
TTT offers an encouraging precedent for other infrastructure financing, including a new 
nuclear power station. It is not surprising that investors will want to finance a project with de 
facto guaranteed returns, so the practical question is what balance of risk protection and 
incentive will satisfy investor demands and the government’s need for value for money? 
The argument for using private finance is that it brings expertise (mainly in the 
construction phase) and frees up state resources for other purposes (at a time when the state 
debt level is likely to face continued pressure from elsewhere).  
There is a good case in principle for institutional investors with long time horizons to 
invest in infrastructure projects. This is particularly true of mature pension funds seeking 
inflation-linked assets to hedge their liabilities. 
There are reasonable grounds for believing that even a project of the scale of SZC 
could achieve the funding needed, if the terms are right. 
Investors are likely to back a similar project structure of sharing cost over-runs and 
under-spends with the customer, and with an upper bound on investment, above which the 
state provides contingent equity. Replicating the TTT state debt facility back up, on a 
materially larger scale, would probably be necessary, and having as explicit and automatic a 
pass through from market interest rates to the allowed cost of debt would help assure debt 
investors. 
There may be a bigger challenge to find equity investors on the scale needed, as the 
pool of infrastructure equity funds, although large, is not all available for new build projects.  
Once the project is completed these funds would probably be ready to buy the (by that stage 
de-risked) equity.  
 
 1
Appendix D   The financial model 
There are a variety of possible funding models for Sizewell C (SZC) but the one considered 
here follows the Thames Tideway Tunnel approach closely (see Appendix C). The 
counterfactual against which to compare this RAB model places all the risk on SZC, which 
would in effect rule out debt finance, and require a rate of return (the WACC) of 8% real.1 
 
D1. Assumptions 
The base case cost of constructing SZC is £500/kW per year for a construction period of 10 
years to commissioning, which if completed on time would have an undiscounted cost of 
£5,000/kW, or for 3.2 GW, a total cost of £16 billion. This is based on the claim that SZC is 
an almost exact replica of HPC, for which costs are now reasonably well identified, and with 
a construction team that comes with experience of constructing HPC. Cost and time over-runs 
are likely highly correlated, so suppose that the rate of expenditure after 10 years falls to 
£300/kW per year of over-run (all prices are in £2018). The undiscounted (over-night) cost is 
£500.Min(T,10)/kW + £300.Max(0,T-10) where T is the construction time in years. 
Total operating costs (O&M, fuel and decommissioning costs) are assumed to be 
£22.50/MWh,2 and the plant life is 60 years. Some of these assumptions will be varied in the 
worst case. This should also include the cost of the risk of a major accident. Lévêque (2015, 
p81) argues that this is low, drawing on upper-case assumptions that the chance of a disaster 
is 1 in 100,000 years of reactor operation with the cost of the damage of €1,000 billion, given 
a cost of €1/MWh. We assume that is included in the total operating costs. 
 
D2. The RAB model 
The RAB model for utilities such as National Grid essentially guarantees that investors will 
earn an agreed Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC) on the Regulatory Asset Base 
(RAB), and that the WACC will be based on a financing structure that assures investment 
grade debt. In effect this limits the debt-to-equity ratio to 70:30. Both the WACC and RAB 
will be revisited at periodic (normally 5-yearly) reviews. The revenues available to reward 
the debt and equity holders will be projected forward at each review allowing for efficient 
investment additions and operating costs. The RAB model will continue to be applied until 
shut-down, 60 years after commissioning, and that is the period over which the depreciation 
and debt are written down (to preserve the 70:30 split). 
Applied to Sizewell C (SZC), which has a lengthy construction period before 
commissioning, the regulator (presumably Ofgem) would agree the time profile of investment 
and the other financial details such as the length of time over which the project is depreciated 
and the WACC based on an acceptable financial structure. In this example the contract length 
will be the life of the asset, 60 years. SZC would then put up 30% of the agreed final 
projected cost (estimated to be £201816 billion or £5,000/kW) as equity to fund the early 
construction stages. This amount of £1,500/kW would be injected at the rate of £150/kW/yr 
                                                 
1 A commercial analysis would do everything in nominal values and take account of tax, but this 
complicates and obscures the results. 
2 See footnote 23 above 
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until the predicted date of construction in year 10.3 Debt would be issued simultaneously at a 
rate of £350/kW/yr, keeping the debt-to-equity ratio no higher than 70:30. The first periodic 
review at year 5 would provide an update to all these numbers, which for the moment we 
assume are unchanged.  
During construction SZC would receive the WACC on the evolving RAB, which 
would be paid for by electricity customers as pre-funding (as with other monopoly regulated 
assets and airport projects such as Heathrow Terminal 5). 
If the project is completed ahead of schedule and budget, then at the second review in 
year 10 70% of the cost savings would be clawed back, leaving SZC with 30% of the savings. 
So if the project came in at the end of year 9 at a cost of £4,500/kW, the revised RAB at year 
10 would be (£4,500 + 0.3x £500)/kW = £4,650/kW. 
If the project were running above budget at the review then SZC would bear 40% of 
the cost-over-run, and this 40% would be added to the previously agreed RAB, until the cost 
reached 130% of the original budgeted cost. At that point, the shareholders (SZC) would be 
asked whether they wished to fund this excess cost at an agreed WACC, failing which the 
Government would take equity in the excess cost (possibly passing that back to customers). 
We assume that is the default outcome, noting that adding £300/kW for five years reaches 
this ceiling of 130% of the budgeted cost. The stress case is discussed below. 
On completion, Ofgem would set the strike price at a level to provide the required 
payments over the next review period. This would be a combination of the operating costs 
(opex) and the capex (the return on the RAB and depreciation of the RAB over the agreed life 
of the project, taken as 60 years). The WACC would be reset in light of the now presumably 
assured evidence of satisfactory commissioning, and each subsequent review would reset the 
strike price in light of the depreciated RAB, the appropriate market determined WACC, and 
updates on forecast opex. Over the modest length of the review period (5 years) the predicted 
constant gross profit would initially fall short of the full return on the RAB and depreciation, 
but later would over-pay, giving the same present value over the period as the declining full 
value of the return on and of the RAB. This would be borne by retained equity profits. 
In addition, to give a comparable cost to the levelised cost of electricity often used for 
base-load comparisons across technologies, we also calculate the constant (real) strike price 
that would recover all costs over the entire lifetime of SZC. 
 
D2.1 Assumptions on the WACC and social discount rate 
In the run-up to almost every price control, the regulator consults on the building blocks of 
the WACC ─ the real debt interest rate, the equity risk premium and the gearing. All are 
contested, with the utilities’ consultants criticising the regulator’s consultants.4 In particular, 
                                                 
3 Another mode of financing would be for SZC to put all its equity in over the first three years and 
raise debt gradually over the remaining construction period, but this lowers the internal rate of return 
to SZC. 
4 See, for example, NERA (2018), Review of Ofgem proposed WACC for Competition Proxy Model of 
delivering new onshore capacity investments, October; and Cambridge Economic Policy Associates 
Ltd (CEPA) (2018), Review of Cost of Capital Ranges for New Assets for Ofgem’s Networks Division, 
23 January 
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there is disagreement as to whether the Total Market Return (TMR, to equity) or the Equity 
Risk Premium is more stable, and if so, at what levels. In practice, this is largely irrelevant as 
the plan would be for competitive book-building to determine the initial WACC, although 
Ofgem would likely revisit this at each periodic review. The approach taken here is classic, in 
that the assumed WACC to SZC is built up as follows. The debt interest is taken as 2% real 
(which is high compared to the TTT, which was set at 180 base points, or 1.8%, above the 
10-year indexed gilt rate, that figure 1 shows is now negative). The equity risk premium is 
taken as 5% (see e.g. Rachel and Summers, 2019, fig 3, p5), which gives a WACC of 3.5%.5 
The discount rate used for evaluating the cost to consumers is taken as 2% real.6  
 
D2.2 Assumptions about cost and time over-runs 
A more comprehensive study would examine a probability distribution of outcomes. We 
approximate this by considering the benchmark on time and budget, a worst case of eight 
years over-run, and an expected case. With a triangular distribution the expected over-run 
would be 2.67 years, which we approximate as commissioning in year 13. Clearly over-run 
costs, duration and probability are uncertain, so these calculations are illustrative rather than 
certainty-equivalent estimates, and are chosen to err on the side of pessimism. The key 
parameters are the expected return to shareholders and to test whether the maximum plausible 
over-run is still viable (i.e. leaves at least a positive real rate of return to the shareholders). As 
a worst case stress test, SZC is assumed to have a time over-run of 8 years and a cost over-
run of 48%, with SZC putting in the required debt and equity finance for its 40% cost share 
up to a cap of 140% of the base cost of £5,000/kW. 
 
D3  Financial analysis and levelised costs7 
D3.1 The RAB base case – everything delivered on time and budget 
Plant availability is set high, averaging 8,000 full output operating hours per year  (91% 
availability). With the financial injections described in the base case, the RAB will earn the 
WACC during construction, the debt will just receive interest, and shareholders will receive 
the residual. Upon completion the RAB will have risen to the full construction cost of 
£5,000/kW, as all the WACC on the rising value will have been paid out as interest and 
return to the shareholders. After completion debt will be gradually retired over the life of the 
                                                 
5 NERA (2018, p. iii) criticised the CEPA (2018) report to Ofgem of a real vanilla WACC for the 
construction phase of the onshore project Hinkley Seabank of 1.58 - 3.45% real (RPI linked) and 
suggested 3.88 - 4.27% real when arguing for the company, with a gearing of 30% (and a negative 
risk-free rate). CEPA’s ERP was 7.1 - 7.5% while NERA’s was 8.9% - 9.3% (implausibly high). 
NERA’s real TMR was 6.5% - 7.1% while CEPA’s was 4.7% - 5.3% (a central value for the past 30 
years in the US).   
6 Although this is below the Treasury Green Book rate the thrust of the earlier argument is that social 
discount rates should be reduced for two reasons: world real rates have trended down and are now 
(and expected to remain) low; while discounting for climate change mitigation justifies an even lower 
rate. 
7 Caveat: the calculations reported here are based on spreadsheet analysis and are subject to the 
normal caveat that there may be errors still to be corrected. The formulae for continuous time 
discounting are given in Appendix F and the key spreadsheet calculations are available on the EPRG 
website. 
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plant (60 years) to maintain the gearing near but no higher than 70%, leading to a change in 
the cash flows paid to debt holders and hence to equity. In the base case in which everything 
is delivered on time, by completion total debt issued has a value of £3,500/kW, with a 
gearing of 70%. To remain below the ceiling, debt will be repaid each year until the debt 
reaches zero near the time when the RAB has fallen to zero at year 70. The simplest way to 
do this is to retire debt at its share of depreciation each year. Amortising the debt of 
£3,500/kW over 60 years reduces its value by £83.33/kW/yr.  
The levelised cost over the life at the WACC is £53/MWh8 and at the SDR of 2% is 
£43/MWh.9 However, the levelised cost to consumers at the SDR is slightly higher as they 
have to prepay on the RAB during construction, and for them it is £49.6/MWh.10 If the strike 
price is set at periodic reviews every five years, then over the first period it would be set at 
£53.72/MWh. At the next review in year 15, the RAB has fallen to £4,583 and the strike price 
for the next period (years 16-20) would fall to £51.90/MWh with the depreciating value of 
the RAB, and then decreasingly rapidly to £33.67/MWh from year 66 to 70.  The internal rate 
of return received by shareholders is 6.9%, marginally below the return assumed in 
computing the WACC, probably due to timing of cash flows.  
The cost of pre-financing borne by electricity consumers averages £308 million/yr 
(for the 3.2 GW plant), which averaged over 300 TWh annual consumption is about 
£1/MWh. For a household consuming 4 MWh/yr this amounts to £4/household/yr. 
Another alternative is that the RAB is written down over a contract period of 35 years 
(and the plant depreciated over this period), with SZC free to sell its output at the market 
price after the end of the contract. Forecasts for electricity wholesale prices after 2070 (at the 
end of the 35 year contract) are lacking. The BEIS Updated energy and emissions 
projections: 2018 give the low (baseload) wholesale price for 2035 (the latest year) as 
£50/MWh, compared to their figure of £52.4/MWh for an average of 2017-18. The ENTSO-E 
day-ahead hourly average for 2017-18 is £51.4/MWh, in reasonable accord. Similarly, the EU 
publishes forecasts to 205011 suggesting that the price in 2050 will be almost identical to the 
2015-2020 price. A defensible assumption is therefore that the post 2070 price might be 
£201850/MWh. 
In this case because debt is retired more rapidly, and because consumers pay the 
higher market price and not the then lower RAB-based price after the end of the contract, the 
levelised cost at the WACC rises to £52.2/MWh, or nearly 11% higher than a whole-life 
contract (at the SDR to £51.2/MWh). The IRR to shareholders rises to 7.7% because of the 
more rapid write-down of the RAB which accelerates customer payments, and after paying 
debt leaves more to equity.  From the consumers point of view a life-time RAB model is 
preferable, if not necessarily for the shareholders. 
                                                 
8 Equation (5) of Appendix F 
9 This takes the full capital cost plus interest at the WACC or SDR during construction and computes 
the resulting levelised cost that recovers this sum. It is not the same as levelising the strike prices, 
which ignore the consumer payments during construction. 
10 Equation (7) of Appendix F 
11 DG-Energy, Energy modelling - EU Reference Scenario 2016 – EU and EU Country Results, 
http://data.europa.eu/euodp/data/dataset/energy-modelling 
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D3.2 Counterfactual: HPC CfD model, base case 
In this case the entire construction is financed by SZC, paying notional WACC on the 
accumulating investments, to deliver at a WACC of 8% an asset value of £7,243/kW, on 
which it would have to earn the WACC and cover depreciation over the following 60 years. 
The levelised cost at the WACC is £96/MWh, or 181% of the RAB levelised cost. The 
levelised cost of transferring the asset value into a fund paying just the SDR would be 
£81/MWh. If the CfD strike price were held constant at the WACC-levelised price, the clear 
cash-flow would be £465/kWyr after paying depreciation, or an immediate return of 6.4%, 
rising as the capital value is depreciated. As SZC bears all the risk, consumers are protected 
through the pre-agreed CfD price (unless the project went into administration with a 
renegotiated and presumably more expensive replacement contract). 
 
D3.3 The worst case, eight year delay, 64% over budget, lower availability 
In this case SZC has to raise 40% of the annual over-run cost taken as £300/kW for eight 
years, with a cap at 130% of the target overnight cost. This cap is reached in year 15 at which 
date the Government starts injecting equity to cover the cost over-run and after which SZC 
injects no more money, nor is the RAB further incremented. At commissioning in year 18 
SZC’s debt is £4,550/kW (assuming that lenders are willing to continue lending at the 
original rate despite the cost over-run) and the book value of equity issued is £1,9500/kW. 
After year 10 and until year 15 the RAB is only incremented by the 60% of the extra 
investment, reaching £5,900/kW, where it remains until commissioning. The return on (but 
not depreciation of) this rising RAB is paid by customers until completion, and thereafter 
depreciation of the RAB would be added). Depreciation of the RAB over the life of the plant 
is £98/kWyr, added to the return on the RAB and paid for by customers. Of the overnight 
cost of £7,400/kW, £900/kW is government equity, assumed to be passed on to consumers, 
who bear £1,500 /kW to be recovered as an addition on electricity prices. In this case the 
return to equity is just over 4.9% (using the continuous time formulae (14-17) in Appenedix 
F). The levelised cost at the target RAB of 3.5% is £76/MWh.12 The levelised cost to 
consumers is £64/MWh at the SDR of 2% (assuming that they also pay for the publicly 
funded excess cost of investment).13 
 
D3.4 The expected case  
Investors contemplating the worst and base case may conclude that the expected time to 
completion is 13 years. In the standard case (cost over-runs at £300/kWyr, availability 8,000 
hours, then with a life-time contract and the same cost sharing as before (the RAB only 
incremented by 60% of the over-spend) then the IRR to shareholders is 6.17%. (The 
continuous time check gives a reassuringly close value of 6.23%.) The continuous time check 
gives a reassuringly close value of 6.23%. If the over-run costs are also higher than expected 
at £350/kWyr and availability only 7,000 hrs, then with a life-time contract and the same cost 
                                                 
12 Equation (6) in Appendix F. 
13 Equation (20) of Appendix F 
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sharing as before (the RAB only incremented by 60% of the over-spend) then the IRR to 
shareholders is 5.4%. The levelised cost to consumers is £57/MWh, allowing for the reduced 
output over which the costs are levelised. Thus the main impact of the RAB assurances on 
cost sharing and capping fall on consumers, not the shareholders. 
 
D3.5 Costs of offshore wind 
Offshore wind costs have been falling sharply over recent years as investors become more 
confident in their performance, lowering the cost of finance. Construction costs have also 
fallen sharply to €2,450/kW (£2,750/kW).14 With a life-time capacity factor of 38%,15 that 
would be equivalent to £6,550/kW “firm”, i.e. 90% availability that a new nuclear power 
station could achieve. Operating costs are currently high but could fall to £62/kWyr or 
£18/MWh by 2030, according to industry sources,16 although they are currently nearly twice 
that level. Connection charges (which require expensive off-shore DC links), and systems 
cost for intermittency would further increase operating costs, while the life-time would be 
less than half that of a new nuclear station. Offshore wind would therefore be comparably 
costly to the worst case considered here. 
 
D3.6 Assessment 
The financial structure and incentive regime would appear to assure SZC shareholders of 
their equity return of 7% real if SZC is built on time and budget, and even in the worst case 
the capping and cost sharing produce an equity return of 4.9% real. The levelised cost of 
electricity delivered (discounting at the WACC) could be as low as £53/MWh and not higher 
than £76/MWh in the worst case considered. The levelised cost to consumers discounting at a 
consumer discount rate of 2% real would give £53/MWh and £64/MWh respectively.
                                                 
14 D. Weston (2019). Europe's offshore wind costs falling steeply, WindPower Offshore, 11 February. 
 https://www.windpoweroffshore.com/article/1525362/europes-offshore-wind-costs-falling-steeply  
15 http://energynumbers.info/uk-offshore-wind-capacity-factors  
16 K. Chamberlain (2017).  Offshore wind opex set to fall 40% by 2030 as suppliers dig deep, 
NewEnergyUpdate, 25 October.  https://www.newenergyupdate.com/wind-energy-update/offshore-
wind-opex-set-fall-40-2030-suppliers-dig-deep  
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Appendix E Valuing risk 
The standard theory of risk taking (for example, that underlies the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model) assumes that agents experience less benefit from an equal increment in wealth to an 
equal decrement in wealth. Algebraically, if U(W) is the utility of wealth level W, then U is 
convex, or U′′ < 0. The value of risky outcomes is then determined by expected utility, 
EU(W), where W is now a random variable. This can be expanded around its mean value, 
EW: 
U(W) ≈ U(EW) + (W- EW)U′(EW) + ½(W- EW)2U′′(EW),   (E1) 
EU(W) ≈ U(EW) - ½ Var(W).(-U′′(EW)).    (E2) 
If r is the risk premium (i.e. the extra amount needed to compensate for the risk in W, 
so that EU(W) = U(EW - r), then expanding around EW: 
EU(W) = U(W - r) ≈ U(EW) - r.U′(EW).    (E3) 
Equation (C1) can be combined with (C2) to give 
r.U′(EW) = ½ Var(W).(-U′′(EW)),    (E4) 
The coefficient of absolute risk aversion, A, is defined as A = - U′′(EW)/U′(EW), 
hence  
r = ½ AVar(W).     (E5) 
The coefficient of relative risk aversion is R, defined as R =  - EW.U′′(EW)/U′(EW) = 
EW.A , so the relative risk premium, r/EW, is 
r/EW ≈ ½ RVar(W)/(EW)2 = ½ R. σ(W)2,    (E6) 
where σ(W) is the coefficient of variation of W.  It is clear from the definition of R and 
equation (A3) that R = η, the elasticity of marginal utility, which is important for studying 
future climate change risks in the context of determining the risk-adjusted social discount 
rate. 
 
The cost of risk and the benefits of sharing risk 
Suppose that the risky prospect is shared by n agents, each of whom takes on W/n. The total 
cost of risk from (E5) is  
½ AnVar(W/n) = ½ AnVar(W)/n2  = ½ AVar(W)/n.    (E7) 
 2
The total cost of the risk has been reduced to 1/n by sharing it across n agents. This is 
particularly relevant when considering the balance of risk and cost in choosing between 
imposing more risk and hence cost on EDF compared to transferring much of the risk but at 
much lower cost of that risk to electricity consumers (or taxpayers).  
 
The treatment of correlated risk  
If the Government, consumers and/or shareholders hold equity in a nuclear power station, 
they add that equity and its risk to an existing portfolio of risky assets. If that existing 
portfolio is W, and the new project (Sizewell C) is the risky asset, X, then from (E2) but now 
measuring utility in cash terms (by dividing through by U′(EW)):  
EU(W) ≈ EW - ½ AVar(W)..     
EU(W+X) ≈ E(W+X) - ½ A[Var(W) + 2 Cov(X,W) + Var(X)],  (E8) 
so 
ΔEU ≡ EU(W+X) - EU(W)  ≈ EX  - ½ A[Var(X) + 2 Cov(X,W)]  (E9) 
ΔEU/EX ≡ B  ≈ 1 – R[r.σW σX + ½ σX2(EX/EW)],   (E10) 
where r is the correlation coefficient between X and W, and σW and σX are the coefficients of 
variation of W and X. If the risk is widely spread (e.g. over the entire economy, all electricity 
consumers, or all shareholders) then EX/EW will be small, so the relative benefit of the 
project is just 1 – Rr.σW σX. To give some sense of how large this might be, if R = η = 1, σW = 
10%, σX = 40%, r = 25%, then B  ≈ 99%. The lower the correlation of the risks of the 
particular project with the relevant portfolio, the lower is the cost of that risk.  
 
Future catastrophic risk  
Suppose that the initial level of consumption is 100, but after 50 years there is a 75% 
probability that consumption will have grown at 1.65% p.a. to 227, a 20% chance that it will 
have fallen back to its initial value of 100, but a 5% chance that it collapses to 10. The simple 
expected value of these outcomes in 50 years’ time is 191, equivalent to an average growth 
rate of 1.3% (Stern’s value). However, the expected utility is 75%log(227) + 20% log(100) + 
5%log(10) = log(164.8) which is equivalent to all consumers experiencing an equivalent 
growth rate of g*=1.1%, lowering the social discount rate from 1.4% to 1.2%. Small chances 
of catastrophic risk reduce, and possibly considerably reduce, the risk-adjusted social 
discount rate. 
This is very much Weitzman’s (1998, 2012) argument that a small chance of bad 
outcomes count very heavily. Specifically, rare events (disasters) happen by definition to 
infrequently for an accurate estimate of their probability, so that we cannot reject the 
hypothesis that the distribution of outcomes is “fat-tailed”, and is not normally distributed but 
at best like the t-distribution. 
 
 
Appendix F
August 1, 2019
1 Equations for the RAB
It is standard regulatory practice in the UK when setting price controls to pay a return on and
of the Regulatory Asset Base (RAB). There have been disputes in the past about determining
the initial value of the RAB after privatization where the sales value may have been considerably
below the replacement cost of the assets (Newbery, 1997). In the case of a new asset, this problem
does not arise. We first consider the simplest case of a new asset that springs into life instantly
and has a well-defined initial value (and initial RAB) of 0. Newbery (1997) establishes the
central result of RAB accounting, that if the initial RAB is written down by its agreed rate of
depreciation, which cumulatively recovers the initial value, then the present value of the stream
of payments of depreciation plus the return on the current written-down RAB will exactly recover
the initial RAB. This applies to any form of depreciation but can be readily demonstrated for
the normal straight line depreciation formula as follows.
The amount to depreciate each year under straight line depreciation over  years is  =
0 . The written-down RAB at date  ≤  is  = 0 − . The present value of the
pay-outs will be
0 =
Z 
0
[(0 −) +]−
= (0 +)
Z 
0
−− 
Z 
0
−
= (0 +)1− 
−
 −(
1− − − −)
 )
0 = 0(1− −) +0− = 0 (1)
Therefore paying interest on and depreciation of the RAB over time does indeed repay the full
initial RAB.
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2 Funding an investment that takes time to construct
Suppose the period of construction is  years during which the expenditure rate is  = 
per year, where  is the total construction cost. It is standard practice to pay interest on work
in progress (“interest during construction”, IDC) and suppose that is at the agreed weighted
average cost of capital (WACC), . (Note discounting as here in continuous time is equivalent to
discounting from the middle, rather than the end of the year. The diﬀerence is quantified in the
appendix.) If the funders receive a return  on the RAB,  at date , then the RAB will just
accumulate at rate , so that  = . The investors will then receive  during construction
while at the same time paying in  for  years. After commissioning they will receive returns
on and of the declining RAB over the amortization period of  years (also the length of the
contract). From (1) the post commissioning flow of funds will exactly recover the RAB at
commissioning, which will be the full construction cost as all ‘interest during construction’ will
have been paid out as the return on the growing RAB. On commissioning, therefore,  =  =
.
The net present discounted value of this flow of payments (negative) and receipts (positive)
will be
0 = −
Z 
0
−+ 
Z 
0
−+ − (2)
= −1− 
−
 + 
1− − − −
 + 
− (3)
= 0 (4)
Thus paying a return on (but no depreciation of) the RAB during construction ensures that the
project earns just its WACC.
2.1 Levelized cost
The accumulated cost of the project including interest during construction at the date of com-
missioning is just ( − 1), and if the station then produces  MWh/yr per kW capacity
for  years, the NPV of this output is just (1− −). If the operating cost is /MWh, the
levelized cost is
 = (
 − 1)
(1− −) +  (5)
This can be used to examine the relationship between the levelized price (the constant strike
price in any contract-for diﬀerence over the life of the station) and either the overnight cost, ,
or the WACC, .
If the project runs over time and budget, suppose the annual cost to completion after date 
is 0 per year and the project takes a further  years to complete. In this case the accumulated
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cost at commissioning is ( − 1) + 0( − 1). The levelized cost will now be
 = 
( − 1) + 0( − 1)
(1− −) +  (6)
3 The Thames Tideway Model
The RAB model has also been applied to the Thames Tideway Tunnel (TTT) project, even
though this is a privately financed stand-alone project. Ofwat, the water regulator guarantees
that investors will earn an agreed WACC on the RAB, and that the WACC will be based on a
financing structure that assures investment grade debt. In eﬀect this limits the debt:equity ratio
to 70:30. Both the WACC and RAB will be revisited at periodic (normally 5-yearly) reviews.
The revenues available to reward the debt and equity holders will be projected forward at each
review allowing for eﬃcient investment additions and operating costs. For the TTT, as there is
no obvious benchmark sales price for the output, the contract (and RAB payments) lasts for the
life of the asset.
Applied to Sizewell C (SZC), which has a lengthy construction period before commissioning,
the regulator (presumably Ofgem) would agree the time profile of investment and the other
financial details such as the length of time over which the project is depreciated and the WACC
based on an acceptable financial structure. SZC would then put up 30% of the agreed final
projected cost (estimated to be £201816 billion or  = £5,000/kW) as equity to fund the early
construction stages. With a debt:equity ratio of 70:30 the total equity of £1,500/kW would be
injected at  = £150/kW per year, and £350/kW per year debt would be issued until the planned
completion and commissioning date in year  = 10. The first periodic review at year 5 would
provide an update to all these numbers, which for the moment we assume are unchanged.
During construction SZC would receive the WACC on the evolving RAB, which would be
paid for by electricity customers as pre-funding (as with other monopoly regulated assets and
airport projects such as Heathrow Runway 3). Debt holders would receive debt interest at rate
, and the shareholders would receive the residual, earning a rate of return . The WACC,
 = + (1− ), where  is the allowed gearing (in this case no higher than 70%).
If all returns on the RAB are paid out continuously, the RAB at completion will just be .
The simplest financing structure to model in continuous time would be for bond-holders to invest
steadily at rate  and equity investors at rate (1−). Return on the RAB during construction
will be  after  years, divided into bond interest, , and the residual providing the return
to shareholders of {+ (1− )}−  = (1− ), as required by the shareholders.
After commissioning, the RAB will decline at rate , so that  years after commissioning,
the RAB is  =  − , with  =  , where  is the period over which the investment
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is amortized and the length of the contract. Total predicted payouts will determine the strike
price that provides the necessary regulatory returns. (After that presumably SZC will continue
to sell into the wholesale market, just as renewable projects do at the end of their contracts.)
The project will now pay out + and the strike price will be set to deliver this revenue
(in practice the strike price would likely be set at a constant value at each 5-yearly periodic
review but here we are treating this as a continuous review process). If  is measured per kW
capacity, and if SZC operates for 8 000 hrs per year, and if the O&M cost (the opex) is /MWh,
then the strike price will be  = +(+)8, where the 8 =  is 8 000 hours per year divided
by 1 000 to convert kW into MW. As the RAB decreases with depreciation, debt will need to be
retired to stay below the gearing limit. Outstanding debt at any date will therefore be (at most)
, and debt will be repaid at rate  = −. Discounting at  to the commissioning
date the stream of payments is worth  from (1). Outstanding debt at date  will be (−)
and total payments to debt-holders will be ( −) +, leaving (1−)[( −) +] to
share-holders, exhausting the total payment stream.
3.1 Post-contract value
If the contract ends before the expected lifetime, , of SZC (60 years), then SZC would enjoy the
full market price, not the RAB-based price, so after the end of the contract the residual revenue
could be considerable. The wholesale price,  , is likely to be at least twice the O&M cost, , so the
annual revenue will be 8(−) per kW capacity, and is value today will be 8(−) R ++ − =
8( − )− (− + −). Thus if  = £50/MWh and  = £225/MWh,  = 65%,  = 10
years,  = 35 years and  = 60 years, then the present value is £146/kW, or just under 3% of
the capital cost.
3.2 The cost to consumers
Consumers pay the WACC on the RAB before they receive any output, and then pay the return
on and of the RAB until the end of the contract (taken here as the life of  = 60 years). The
levelized cost of the capital (to which must be added the operating cost) discounted at the social
discount rate (SDR) of  can be determined by first computing the accumulated payment to
commissioning, , and then discounting the return on and of the RAB after commissioning,  .
This gives the total discounted capital payments to be spread over the discounted future output.
The accumulated value to commissioning is
 = 
Z 
0
 = 
1− (1−  )
  (7)
The NPV of future payments will be
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 = 
Z 
0
[ + 1]−− 
Z 
0
−
 = ( + 1)1− 
−
 −


1− (1 + )−
  (8)
The sum of the two will be spread over the discounted future output, which at  MWh/yr
per kW capacity, is (1− −) to give the levelized capital cost, to which must be added the
operating costs to give the levelized cost to consumers, :
 = 
+ 
1− − +  (9)
4 Cost over-runs
The TTT contract (taken here as a model for a possible SZC contact) specifies that if the project
exceeds the agreed cost, the RAB will only be incremented by  of the cost over-run ( = 60%,
with a higher share, 70% of the benefits of cost under-runs accruing to the shareholders). Only a
smaller part of the additional investment cost can be funded by issuing bonds without breaching
the gearing share ceiling, , so shareholders will be called to put in a fraction 1 −  of the
extra investment needed. This will be capped when the construction cost exceeds (1 + ),
where for TTT  = 30%. After the cap is reached, all additional finance will be supplied by the
government (perhaps passing this on to customers), if the original shareholders are unwilling to
finance it (in return from some assured revenue stream).
If the project is  years late, and if late investment occurs at rate 0 and if 0 = ,
with   , then the project will reach the cap  years after the planned date and before
commissioning. Until the cap is reached, debt and equity will continue to be raised but only
a fraction  will be added to the RAB to produce an income flow to shareholders, and the
remaining (1 − ) will be borne by shareholders, who will also have to pay out interest on the
non-RAB backed debt. The allowed RAB at various dates will be
 =  0 ≤  ≤ 
 =  + 0(−  )    ≤  + 
 = (1 + )  +  ≤  ≤ 
 = (1 + )(1− )  = − −  0   ≤
The resulting flow of receipts by the shareholders (contributions shown negative) in succes-
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sive periods up to the date of commissioning will be
1 = (( − )− (1− )) = (1− )(− 1) 0 ≤  ≤  (10)
2 = ( − ){ + 0(−  )}− (1− )0  ≤  ≤  +  (11)
3 = ( − )(1 + )  +  ≤  ≤  + (12)
The first line is the flow of returns to and cost of the approved investment (noting that − =
(1− ) from the definition of the WACC), the second line is the return of the allowed share 
of the cost overspend and the residual cost to shareholders after raising debt for the approved
share up to the date when further investment is paid by the government, while the final line
is the income less interest payments on the capped value of the RAB, which remains constant
until commissioning. The RAB at that date will be the capped value  = (1 + ), and this
will be recovered over its remaining life at the agreed WACC, . The resulting flow of funds
to shareholders (out of which they need to repay debt) is equivalent to a permanent income
stream of . The accumulated debt (1 + ) (on which interest has already been paid to
commissioning) can also be amortized over an infinite life and discounted to give an equivalent
annual cost to shareholders of (1 + ). The term ( − ) = (1− ) from the formula for
the WACC, where  is the target real equity return and  =  .
The internal rate of return to shareholders, , is value that makes the present discounted
outlays equal to the PDV of receips (equations (15) to (17) ) plus the discounted subsequent
income stream net of debt (equation (13)) equal to zero:
0 =
Z +
0
−+ −(+) (1− ) (1 + ) where (13)Z +
0
− =
Z 
0
1−+ −
Z 
0
2−+ −(+)
Z −
0
3− (14)
= (1− )
µ
(

 − 1)
(1− −
 −


−
¶
(15)
+−
⎛
⎝ (1− )
0{ − −12 }+
{(1− ) − (1− )0}1−−
⎞
⎠ (16)
+(1− )(1 + ) 
− − −
  (17)
These expressions can be simplified by dividing through by  given a value for 0. Equation
(14) can be solved for  once 0 and the other parameters      and  are specified. If
the over-spend does not reach the cap then only the first two lines of the RAB equations need
to be integrated, or, equivalently, set  = .
As a check, set  =  =  =  = 0, to confirm that setting  =  makes the equation zero.
The second term in (13) is just (1−)− , which is the present value of equity, while the first
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term is (15) or
−(1− )− = −(1− )− 
as required.
4.1 The worst-case cost to consumers
Cost over-runs impact consumers more heavily and raise their levelized cost. If all the Gov-
ernment equity support is allocated to consumers, the worst case can be evaluated as follows.
The accumulated cost up to commissioning will an additional term (the investment over-run not
borne by shareholders) of 0−, as well as the return on the RAB. If this process of meeting
the publicly funded investment shortfall starts  years after the target date,  , this accumulated
additional investment cost will be 0((−) − 1), so the total accumulated cost will be:
∗ = 
Z +
0
+ 
0((−) − 1)
 
=  + 
Z 
0
( + 0)+ {(1 + ) + 0}
(−) − 1
 
=  + (
 − 1)
 +
0

1− (1− )
 + {(1 + ) + 
0}(
(−) − 1)
 (18)
The post-commissioning discounted payments,  ∗, are
 ∗ = (1 + ) (19)
while the discounted future output is the same as before, (1− −), to give the worst case
levelized cost to consumers as
∗ = 
∗ +  ∗
1− − +  (20)
Other cases can be computed similarly using subsets of the RAB elements.
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Symbol Definition example
 debt share 70%
 RAB increment 60%
 cap as fraction 30%
 social discount rate 2%
 convert from kw to MWH/yr 8
 IRR to equity calculate
 variable cost £22.50/MWh
 depreciation/kWyr 
 debt interest 2%
 investment rate £500/kW
0 over-run investment £300/kW
 target overnight cost £5,000/kW
 lifetime 60 years
 contract length 35 years
 over-run at cap 3 years
 max over-run 8 years
 strike price calculate
 wholesale price £50/MWh
 WACC 3.5%
 levelized consumer cost calculate
 equity return calculate
 plan construction 10 yrs
Table 1 Symbols and their definition
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Appendix Adjusting for payments at the end of the year
Continuous discounting as in the text eﬀectively discounts from the middle of the year, while
conventional accounting discounts payments made at the end of the year. For a continuous flow
of funds  over  years at discount rate  the PDV is (1− − ) but receiving the funds at
the end of the year has present value (1 − (1 + )− ). The ratio of the discrete flow to the
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continuous flow for  = 5% and  = 30 years is 099, so the diﬀerence is slight over longer time
periods and modest discount rates. If  = 10%,  = 10 years, the ratio falls to 097.
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